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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, July 1, 1986, through July 1, 1987, the
Illinois Supreme Court considered a wide range of criminal law
issues. This article will describe the cases that were decided, as
well as examine the court's position on the issues presented. Addi-
tionally, this article will highlight important changes in, and addi-
tions to, the criminal statutory law of Illinois during the Survey
period.
II. CASE LAW
The Illinois Supreme Court exercised great discretion in its re-
view of substantive criminal law during the Survey period. Conse-
quently, the volume of case law available for examination is
relatively low. During the Survey period, the court reviewed con-
victions based primarily upon circumstantial evidence, convictions
based upon the commission of more than one offense, and convic-
tions involving lesser included offenses. The court construed pro-
visions in statutes governing the use of deadly force in defense of
dwellings, aggravated battery of a child, forgery, eavesdropping,
and driving under the influence. The court also determined the
constitutionality of several statutes involving arson, controlled sub-
stances, mandatory seat belts, driving privileges, and highway
solicitation.
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A. The State's Burden of Proving a Defendant Guilty Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt
1. Circumstantial Evidence: The Dream Murder Case
In People v. Linscott,' the court upheld a conviction based exclu-
sively upon circumstantial evidence. At trial, the jury found the
defendant not guilty of rape, but guilty of the murder of his neigh-
bor, a twenty-four year old female student.2 The conviction was
based upon the defendant's voluntary recounting to the police of
his dream of an unknown woman's brutal beating.3 Although
some physical evidence corroborated the dream, other physical evi-
dence did not.4
In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the court did not
distinguish between appellate review of convictions based upon di-
rect evidence and appellate review of convictions based upon cir-
cumstantial evidence. In doing so, the court neither used the
standards for deciding circumstantial evidence cases, nor stated
that it was abandoning those standards.
Influenced primarily by the defendant's dream, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, affirmed the trial
court's conviction, 5 and remanded.6 The court concluded that the
1. 114 I11. 2d 340, 500 N.E.2d 420 (1986).
2. Id. at 342, 500 N.E.2d at 421. Linscott received a forty-year prison sentence. Id.
3. Id. at 344-46, 500 N.E.2d at 421-23.
4. Id. at 347-48, 500 N.E.2d at 423. For an accounting of the physical evidence dis-
covered at the scene of the murder, see infra notes 7 and 8. For a concise yet more
detailed accounting of the facts in the case, the defendant's statements to the police, and
the physical evidence presented to the court, see the appendix set forth in the appellate
court's opinion on remand in Linscott, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1303, 511 N.E.2d 1303 (1st Dist.
1987).
5. Linscott, 114 Ill. 2d at 349, 500 N.E.2d at 421. The appellate court reversed the
conviction because it concluded that Linscott's failure to admit guilt was significant in
preventing his dream account from attaining confession status. The appellate court held
that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to exclude every reasonable theory of
innocence. It further ruled that because the defendant's account was either inexplicit or
inconsistent with many of the facts, it merely raised a possibility or suspicion of the de-
fendant's guilt. Linscott, 135 II1. App. 3d 773, 777-79, 482 N.E.2d 403, 407 (1st Dist.
1985).
Justice McNamara, however, would have affirmed the conviction based on: (1) the
defendant's (dream) statements to the police exhibiting his knowledge of the crime, which
he found equivalent to a confession, and (2) the support of certain physical evidence such
as hair and blood findings. Id. at 780-81, 482 N.E.2d at 408 (McNamara, J., dissenting).
6. Linscott, 114 Ill. 2d at 349, 500 N.E.2d at 424. On remand, the appellate court
considered two issues which it did not previously address. First, the court examined the
prosecution's presentation of expert testimony in its closing argument. Second, the court
scrutinized the State's destruction of physical evidence in the case. Subsequently, the
appellate court remanded the case for a new trial on the murder charge because it con-
cluded that the prosecutor's fabrication and distortion of evidence during closing argu-
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defendant's dream reflected his personal knowledge of unusual de-
tails of the crime which sufficiently supported a jury's inference of
guilt.7 Based on the dream and certain forensic evidenceO the
court concluded that the evidence was not "so unsatisfactory that
no rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt," and concluded that the conviction was
reasonable. 9
Chief Justice Clark wrote a lengthy dissent criticizing the major-
ity's failure to distinguish the standard used in reviewing a case
based upon circumstantial evidence from a case based upon direct
evidence.' 0 The Chief Justice advocated following the court's pre-
cedent of distinct standards of appellate review," and he charged
ment regarding blood and hair comparisons were "so egregious" that the defendant was
denied a fair trial. People v. Linscott, 159 Ill, App. 3d 71, 511 N.E.2d 1305 (1st Dist.
1987). Regarding the physical evidence, the State conducted a destructive test on the
only vaginal swab taken from the victim after the defendant had requested, in a pre-trial
discovery motion, a "list of all physical property that the State intends to use at trial" and
that he have access to evidence prior to trial. Id. at 81, 511 N.E.2d at 1310. The court
concluded that defendant's due process rights were not violated because the vaginal swab
was not material and, thus, irrelevant to defendant's case; and, even if material and rele-
vant, the evidence was inadmissible because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed any possible probative value. Id. at 83-84, 511 N.E.2d at 1311-12.
7. Linscott, 114 111. 2d at 344-47, 500 N.E.2d at 422-23. The court concentrated on
the similarities between the defendant's statements and the actual crime. The defendant's
account of the beating, his knowledge of the murder weapon, his knowledge of the vic-
tim's passive acceptance of the attack, his description of blood splatterings, and the pres-
ence of a stereo all corroborated physical evidence found at the scene. Id. at 344-45, 500
N.E.2d at 422. Although the supreme court never stated the evidence was purely circum-
stantial, the State conceded and the appellate court treated it as such.
8. Id. at 347-48, 500 N.E.2d at 423. The court also relied on certain physical evi-
dence to support the conviction. Blood and hair samples taken from the scene matched
samples taken from the defendant. However, police also recovered physical evidence un-
related to the defendant, such as the hair of a black man. Id. at 347-48, 500 N.E.2d at
423. Thus, although the court viewed the physical evidence as inconclusive when stand-
ing alone, when taken with the defendant's personal knowledge of the facts surrounding
the crime, inferred from his dream, the court held the evidence sufficient for conviction.
Id. at 348-49, 500 N.E.2d at 424.
9. Id. at 348, 500 N.E.2d at 423. The Linscott court followed the standard of review
set forth in People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 935 (1985), reh'g. denied, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985) (when reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence, it is not the court's function to retry the defendant). In Collins a participant in
the defendant's activities provided the State with direct evidence and the court used a
standard of review for convictions based upon direct evidence.
10. Linscott, 114 Il1. 2d at 349-57, 500 N.E.2d at 424-28 (Clark, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
11. Since 1917, the court has distinguished the review of a conviction based upon
circumstantial evidence from the review of a conviction based upon direct evidence. The
court has stated that when the only evidence against the defendant is circumstantial evi-
dence, "the guilt of the accused must be so thoroughly established as to exclude every
other reasonable hypothesis." People v. Ahrling, 279 Il1. 70, 116 N.E. 764 (1917). The
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the majority with applying the wrong standard.' 2 In this case, the
dissent concluded that the facts and circumstances did not exclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and did not meet the rea-
sonable and moral certainty standards required for convictions
based on circumstantial evidence alone. 13
Justice Simon also dissented, concluding that the evidence was
wholly circumstantial, the inferences too tenuous, and the dream
evidence too ambiguous to exclude every other reasonable hypoth-
esis of innocence.1 4 He charged the majority with incorrectly as-
sessing the coincidences between the defendant's dream and the
murder, and with overemphasizing the similarities and ignoring
the differences.' 5 Not only did he conclude that reasonable doubt
existed, he concluded also that the evidence failed to prove either
knowledge or intent.16 Justice Simon argued that without these es-
sential elements, the conviction must fail and should have been
court has consistently followed this rule. People v. Lewellen, 43 Ill. 2d 74, 250 N.E.2d
651 (1969); People v. Rhodes, 85 Ill. 2d 241, 422 N.E.2d 605 (1981); People v. Whitlow,
89 Ill. 2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629 (1982). In People v. Bryant, 113 I11. 2d 497, 499 N.E.2d
413 (1986), the court held that juries need no longer be given the reasonable hypothesis
instruction. Id. at 511, 499 N.E.2d at 419. However, in neither Linscott nor Bryant has
the court stated that it was abandoning the well-established standard for appellate review.
For a discussion of the reasonable hypothesis thenry as related in Bryant see infra notes
60, 71-74 and accompanying text.
12. Linscott, 114 111. 2d at 349, 500 N.E.2d at 424 (Clark, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Chief Justice Clark concluded that the defendant's statement repre-
sented a dream and not a recollection of an actual event. He concluded the dream was
purely circumstantial evidence. Id. at 353, 500 N.E.2d at 425-26. Verdicts in cases based
upon wholly circumstantial evidence rested on both the witness' credibility and on the
reasonableness of inferences drawn from presented facts. Id. at 355, 500 N.E.2d at 427.
Although Chief Justice Clark agreed that a reasonable hypothesis instruction need no
longer be given to a jury, he advocated retaining the reasonable hypothesis standard for
purposes of appellate review. Id. at 355, 500 N.E.2d at 427. For a more detailed account
of the reasonable hypothesis theory, see supra notes 60, 71-74 and accompanying text.
13. Id. at 356-57, 500 N.E.2d at 427-28 (Clark, C. J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Chief Justice Clark believed that the court defied common sense by conclud-
ing that the defendant's description of the details of the crime was "unusual" or
"strangely coincidental." Id. at 356, 500 N.E.2d at 427. Declaring the forensic evidence
weak and lacking in all probative value, the Chief Justice concluded that Linscott was
convicted upon suspicion alone. The Justice acknowledged that the defendant had de-
scribed only one truly unusual detail connected with the crime, which was the victim's
passive acceptance of death evidenced by a Hindu hand-signal made at the time of death.
The Chief Justice concluded that this one coincidence could not alone entitle the reason-
able jury to convict the defendant. Id. at 357, 500 N.E.2d at 428 (Clark, C. J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
14. Id. at 358, 361, 500 N.E.2d at 428, 429-30 (Simon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
15. Id. at 358-60, 500 N.E.2d at 428-29. (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). For a further critical examination of the evidence against Linscott, see People v.
Linscott, 135 Ill. App. 3d 773, 777-79, 482 N.E. 2d 403, 406-07.
16. Linscott, 114 I11. 2d at 360, 500 N.E.2d at 429.
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reversed. 17
2. Felony-Murder
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed a felony-murder conviction
in People v. Brackett.'8 In Brackett, the defendant raped and se-
verely beat an eighty-five year old widow, Mrs. Winslow, forced
her to write a check for one hundred and twenty-five dollars, and
after cooking himself a meal and taking a nap, left the victim lying
naked and severely bruised in her living room.' 9 The State charged
Randy Brackett with rape, deviate sexual assault, and aggravated
battery.20 Although her injuries were healing, Mrs. Winslow be-
came extremely depressed and refused to eat.2' The trauma caused
Mrs. Winslow's condition to worsen progressively, and she was
subsequently transferred from the hospital to a nursing home
where she continued to refuse to eat.22 Five weeks after the initial
attack, the victim died of asphyxiation, which resulted from six
ounces of food being aspirated into her trachea.23 Subsequently, the
defendant was charged with and convicted of murder.24
On appeal, the defendant contended that he was not proven
guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence
was insufficient to prove that any criminal agency had caused the
death.25 Brackett contended also that even if agency were proven,
17. Id. at 360-61, 500 N.E.2d at 430 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Not only did Justice Simon find the dream evidence too ambiguous and the foren-
sic evidence too inconclusive, he also found two factors creating independent substantial
doubt: (1) lack of evidence that the victim knew her assailant, and (2) lack of motive on
the defendant's part. Id. at 361, 500 N.E.2d at 430 (Simon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
18. 117 Ill. 2d 170, 510 N.E.2d 877 (1987).
19. Id. at 173, 510 N.E.2d at 879.
20. Id. at 172, 510 N.E.2d at 878.
21. Id. at 173, 510 N.E.2d at 879. Mrs. Winslow suffered a broken arm, a broken rib,
bruises on her face, neck, arms, trunk, and inner thighs, and internal abdominal bruises
around the colon and kidney. Id. at 173, 510 N.E.2d at 879-80.
22. Id. at 173-74, 510 N.E.2d at 879.
23. Id. at 175, 510 N.E.2d at 880. Mrs. Winslow's nasal passages were too small and
her facial injuries too severe to permit feeding by a nasal gastric tube. Id. at 174, 510
N.E.2d at 879. Consequently, Mrs. Winslow was fed small portions of pureed food on a
spoon by nursing personnel. Id. Mrs. Winslow died while being fed. Id. at 174, 510
N.E.2d at 879-80. A pathologist testified that although none of Mrs. Winslow's injuries
directly caused her death, the pain associated with a broken rib will inhibit deep breath-
ing, limiting the amount of air available to the lungs which is needed to expel food from
the trachea. Id. at 175, 510 N.E.2d at 880.
24. Id. at 172, 510 N.E.2d at 879.
25. Id. at 175, 510 N.E.2d at 880. The defendant argued that Mrs. Winslow's as-
phyxiation was an intervening event totally unrelated to his admitted crimes of rape and
aggravated battery. Id. at 175-76, 510 N.E.2d at 880.
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he had neither the intent to kill nor the knowledge that his acts
created a strong probability of death.26 Additionally, Brackett
claimed that he could not have foreseen that death was a likely
consequence of his bare-fisted blows upon the victim. 27
The court rejected all of the defendant's arguments. 28 The court
observed that Illinois courts have held consistently that an inter-
vening cause, if completely unrelated to a defendant's acts, will re-
lieve a defendant of criminal liability. The supreme court
acknowledged, however, that the defendant still could be found
guilty of murder when his criminal acts contributed to a persons's
death.2 9 A defendant's acts need not be the sole cause of death.30
The court refused to find reversible error on the issue of causation
and affirmed the circuit court's findings of fact and judgment that
the defendant's acts set in motion a chain of events culminating in
Mrs. Winslow's death.31
The court rejected also the defendant's contention that he lacked
the requisite mental state for murder.32 The court reiterated that
death may be the natural consequence of bare-fisted blows, when
there is great disparity in size and strength between the two par-
ties. 3 Finally, the court held that a defendant's inability to foresee
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 181, 510 N.E.2d at 882.
29. Id. at 176, 510 N.E.2d at 880 (citing People v. Meyers, 392 Il. 355, 64 N.E.2d
531 (1946); Cunningham v. People, 195 Ill. 550, 63 N.E. 517 (1902); People v. Schreiber,
104 Il1. App. 3d 618, 432 N.E.2d 1316 (1982); People v. Gulliford, 86 Il1. App. 3d 237,
407 N.E.2d 1094 (1980); People v. Brown, 57 Ill. App. 3d 528, 373 N.E.2d 459 (1978);
People v. Paulson, 80 Il1. App. 2d 44, 225 N.E.2d 424 (1967)).
30. 117 II1. 2d at 176, 510 N.E.2d at 880 (citing People v. Reader, 26 Ill. 2d 210, 186
N.E.2d 298 (1962)).
31. Id. at 176-77, 510 N.E.2d at 880-81. The court acknowledged that uncontra-
dicted evidence showed that the ability to expel food was related directly to the volume of
air present in the lungs. Mrs. Winslow could neither breathe deeply nor expel food from
her trachea, a nasal feeding tube could not be used because of the beating she received,
and her depressed, weakened, and debilitated state was the direct result of her trauma
resulting from the defendant's attack upon her. Id. at 178, 510 N.E.2d at 881. The court
stated that a defendant takes his victim as he finds him, and despite a pre-exiting condi-
tion, proof of causation will be sufficient as long as the defendant's acts contribute to
death. Id. The court stated also that a person's age is a significant part of his existing
health condition. Id. at 179, 510 N.E.2d at 881-81,.
32. Id. at 179, 510 N.E.2d at 882. Supported by the long-standing Illinois principle
of law that death is not ordinarily contemplated as a natural consequence of bare-fisted
blows, the defendant argued that he could not know his blows created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm. Id.
33. Id. The court concluded that the trier of fact was, in this case, entitled to find
that a twenty-one year old male, 6'3" tall, weighing 170 pounds who battered and raped
an eighty-five year old widow, set in motion a chain of events that contributed to her
death. Id. at 179, 510 N.E.2d at 882.
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the precise manner of death will not relieve him of responsibility
when he is charged with a felony. 34 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that Brackett need not have foreseen that his victim would
die from asphyxiation in order to be found guilty of felony
murder.35
3. Testimony of an Accomplice Witness
The Illinois Supreme Court once again gave deference to the
trier of fact and upheld a conviction based upon the sufficiency of
evidence reflected in th~e uncorroborated testimony of an accom-
plice witness in People v. Titone.36 In a bench trial, the court con-
victed Dino Titone of armed robbery and the aggravated
kidnapping and murder of two victims. 37 The State introduced the
voluntary testimony of the codefendant's girlfriend, who served as
the "back-up" driver during the crime.38 The witness testified that
the defendant shot the victims and left them to die in an automo-
bile trunk parked in a forest preserve. 39 Before he died, one of the
victims identified the codefendant, but failed to identify the
defendant.
The defendant contended that he was not proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt because the only evidence connecting him with
the crimes was the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice wit-
ness. 4° He argued further that the witness' testimony was suspect
because she had hopes for a reward from prosecution and because
she had used cocaine during her relationship with one of the
34. Id.
35. Id. at 181, 510 N.E.2d at 882.
36. 115 I11. 2d 413, 505 N.E.2d 300 (1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 210 (1987).
37. Id. at 415, 505 N.E.2d at 300. Defendants Robert J. Gacho and Joseph Sorren-
tino were also charged and convicted of the same crimes. The three cases were severed
and Titone and Gacho were subsequently tried simultaneously before a single judge.
Gacho elected a jury trial. Titone chose a bench trial. The court subsequently sentenced
him to death. Id.
38. Id. at 416, 505 N.E.2d at 300-01. The codefendant's girlfriend and back-up
driver was the prosecution's chief witness. Id.
39. Id. at 416-17, 505 N.E.2d at 301.
40. Id. at 418, 505 N.E.2d at 301-02. The defendant contended also that even if the
witness' testimony served to corroborate evidence as to certain events on the morning of
the murders, it did not corroborate evidence concerning the identity of the perpetrator.
Id. at 419, 505 N.E.2d at 302. He argued further that the circuit court erred in admitting
into evidence a prior court-reported statement of the witness which he believed was moti-
vated by her desire to avoid prosecution. Id. at 422-23, 505 N.E.2d at 303-04. Lastly, the
defendant contended that his right to remain silent was violated when the State was per-
mitted to impeach his exculpatory testimony by questioning him about his failure to ad-
vise police, at the time of his arrest, of his whereabouts on the night of the murders. Id.
at 423-24, 505 N.E.2d at 304.
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defendants.4 1
The supreme court concluded that the discovery of the victims
at the scene sufficiently corroborated the sole witness' testimony
implicating the defendant. The court ruled that the witness' state-
ments were consistent, voluntary, uninfluenced by any "deal" with
the State, and unaffected by drugs. Therefore, the evidence was
not so improbable as to create reasonable doubt.4 2 Finding the evi-
dence sufficient, the court agreed with the trial court's assessment
of the witness' credibility and conclusion of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.43
In dissent, Justice Simon emphasized the lack of any physical
evidence tying the defendant to the crime and criticized the major-
ity for creating reasons explaining the victim's failure to identify
the defendant. 44 Furthermore, the chief witness was an accom-
plice, transported to the police station sixteen hours after the
crime, only after the police came to her house. Also, she made her
statement after police fingerprinted, photographed, and
Mirandized her. In light of these events, Justice Simon questioned
the voluntariness of her testimony and asserted that her involve-
ment was deep enough to cast significant doubt upon her story.45
In Justice Simon's view, a defendant cannot properly be convicted
on the basis of such testimony alone.46
B. Consideration of Improper Factors: Multiple Conviction
Arising Out of a Single Act
In People v. Lego,47 a jury convicted and sentenced the defendant
41. Id. at 418-19, 505 N.E.2d at 302.
42. Id. at 421-23, 505 N.E.2d at 302-03. The court concluded that the witness volun-
tarily agreed to accompany police and that "the only thing asked of her in order to avoid
being charged with a crime was that she tell the truth." Id. at 420, 505 N.E.2d at 302.
The court found no evidence that she had any hopes of escaping prosecution by implicat-
ing the defendant. Id. at 420, 505 N.E.2d at 303. Although the witness testified that she
often used cocaine during the course of her relationship with one of the accomplices, the
court found no evidence of drug usage at the time of trial that would bear on the credibil-
ity of her testimony. Id. at 419, 505 N.E.2d at 303.
43. Id. at 422, 505 N.E.2d at 303. The court ordered the defendant executed by
lethal injection. Id. at 426, 505 N.E.2d at 305.
44. Id. at 427, 505 N.E.2d at 305-06 (Simon, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 427-28, 505 N.E.2d at 306 (Simon, J., dissenting). The witness was told that
the defendants were going "to waste" the victims, yet she made no attempt to leave.
Instead, without compulsion, she attempted to conceal a weapon, but found it would not
fit in her purse, and she supplied the "backup" car. Id. at 427, 505 N.E.2d at 306 (Simon,
J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 428, 505 N.E.2d 306 (Simon, J., dissenting).
47. 116 Il1. 2d 323, 507 N.E.2d 800 (1987).
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to death on each of four counts of murder.48 Each murder count
dealt with the brutal beating and stabbing of Mary Mae Johnson,
an eighty-two-year-old widow.49
The supreme court ruled that the trial court erred in entering
judgment on each of the four murder counts because the defend-
ant, in fact, committed only one homicide.50 Guided principally by
the precedents set in People v. Szabo,51 People v. King,12 and People
v. Mack,s3 the court held that convictions for more than one of-
fense cannot be carved from the same physical act. 54 The court
reasoned that when multiple convictions were obtained for offenses
arising out of a single act, sentence may be imposed only for the
most serious offense committed." In the defendant's case, the
court affirmed the most serious offense of intentional murder.56
48. Id. at 332, 507 N.E.2d at 802. The four counts of murder were based upon one
intentional murder count and three felony murder counts. The counts were as follows:
(i) intentional murder by beating and stabbing, (2) murder while committing the forcible
felony of burglary with intent to commit murder, (3) murder while committing burglary
with intent to commit theft, and (4) murder while committing an armed robbery. Id.
49. Id. The victim was found dead in her home after having been stabbed repeatedly
and bludgeoned. Id.
50. Id. at 344, 507 N.E.2d at 807-08.
51. 94 111. 2d 327, 447 N.E.2d 193 (1983). In Szabo, the defendant was convicted of
two counts of intentional murder, two counts of felony-murder, and one count of conspir-
acy to commit armed robbery. The court held that because only two victims were killed,
the defendant could be convicted of only two murders. The court, therefore, erred by
convicting the defendant on all four counts. Id. at 350, 447 N.E.2d at 204.
52. 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894 (1977). In King,
the defendant was convicted of rape and burglary with intent to commit rape. The court
sentenced him to concurrent terms on the rape conviction and on the burglary convic-
tion. The court held that the constitution did not bar multiple convictions and concur-
rent sentences for offenses arising from multiple acts that are identical to or motivated by
some greater criminal objective. Id. at 565, 363 N.E.2d at 844. Because the offenses of
rape and burglary were based on separate acts, each requiring proof of a different ele-
ment, convictions for both can be proper. Id. at 566, 363 N.E.2d at 844-45. When more
than one offense arises from a series of incidental or closely related acts, and the offenses
are not lesser included offenses, the court can enter convictions with concurrent
sentences. Id. at 566, 363 N.E.2d at 845.
53. 105 Ill. 2d 103, 473 N.E.2d 880 (1984). In Mack, the defendant was convicted of
two counts of armed robbery and three counts of murder based on the shooting death of a
security guard during a bank robbery. The court held that the defendant should have
been convicted of only one count of robbery because there was only one taking of money
from the bank. It further held that, although there was evidence to support the three
murder charges, the defendant could be convicted of only one count of murder because
the defendant murdered only one man. Only the conviction for the more culpable charge
of intentionally and knowingly shooting and killing the victim which arose out of a single
act could stand and sentence could be imposed only for the most serious offense. Id. at
136-37, 473 N.E.2d at 897-98.
54. Lego, 116 Ill. 2d at 344, 507 N.E.2d at 807-08.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 344, 507 N.E.2d at 808.
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Having affirmed the primary murder conviction, the court vacated
the conviction on the redundant homicide counts and upheld the
order for Lego's execution by lethal injection. 7
C. Instructions to the Jury
1. Lesser Included Offenses
The supreme court reversed a conviction in People v. Bryant"8
because the trial judge refused to give the defendant's tendered in-
struction on criminal damage to property as a lesser included of-
fense to the charge of attempted burglary59 and on the evidentiary
burden to be met when all evidence of guilt is circumstantial. °
57. Id. at 353, 507 N.E.2d at 812. Justice Simon dissented in part because he believed
the Illinois death penalty to be unconstitutional. For a discussion of significant aspects of
criminal procedure also considered by Lego involving pretrial publicity, venue, discovery,
scope of permissible arguments by counsel, jury instruction, death penalty, sentencing
and fair hearing, see the Criminal Procedure article in this Survey.
58. 113 Ill. 2d 497, 499 N.E.2d 413 (1986).
59. Id. at 501-02, 499 N.E.2d at 415. A lesser included offense:
(a) Is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less
culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the
commission of the offense charged, or
(b) Consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense in-
cluded therein.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-9 (1985). The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized
three methods for determining whether a particular offense is an included offense of an-
other. They are as follows: (1) by comparing the statutory definitions of the offense to
determine whether the more serious offense contains all the elements of the lesser offense,
(2) if the more serious offense does not include every element of the lesser offense, by
examining the charging instrument to determine whether it contains the missing ele-
ment(s) necessary for the lesser offense, and (3) by employing the inherent relationship
test which looks to the trial proof presented and requires the lesser and greater offenses to
be inherently related. The supreme court expressly declined to adopt the inherent rela-
tionship method finding it counterproductive. Bryant, 113 I1. 2d at 503, 499 N.E.2d at
415-16.
60. Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d at 502, 499 N.E.2d at 415. The appellate court found error
with this refusal. The court ruled that because there were no eyewitnesses to the crime,
the court should have given the tendered instruction regarding circumstantial evidence.
Bryant, 131 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 476 N.E.2d 796 (3d Dist. 1985).
The tendered instruction at issue was Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) Criminal,
No. 3.02 (2d ed. 1981). The instruction provided as follows:
Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts or circumstances which give rise to a
reasonable inference of other facts which tend to show the guilt or innocence of
defendant. [It] should be considered by you together with all the other evidence
.... You should not find the defendant guilty unless the facts or circumstances
proved exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.
Id. The court has subsequently found the reasonable theory of innocence instruction
obscure and misleading. For a discussion of the reasonable theory of innocence instruc-
tion, see infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
In dissent, Justice Barry alleged the State had not proved the specific intent necessary
to satisfy the requisite mental state for the lesser crime of criminal damage to property.
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A jury convicted Donald L. Bryant of the attempted burglary of
a service station and sentenced him to an extended term of six
years imprisonment.6' Police officers arrested the fleeing defendant
about twenty feet from the service station.62 The burglary gates of
the service station were pried away and several panes of glass were
broken. The defendant was not wearing a shirt at the time of his
arrest and police found a torn, knotted shirt nearby. The service
station's owner noticed that several tires stacked outside the station
window and a display just inside the window had been disturbed.
Although the evidence was primarily circumstantial, the State
presented direct testimony and certain physical evidence that con-
nected the defendant to the crime. The defendant presented no
evidence at trial.63
The supreme court ruled that the trial court should have given
the lesser included offense instruction of criminal damage to prop-
erty.64 Although the charging instrument did not explicitly specify
all the elements of the lesser offense,65 the court concluded that the
indictment set out the main outline of the lesser offense and implic-
itly set out the mental state of knowledge necessary for conviction
of the lesser offense.66 The indictment alleged attempted burglary67
which required a knowing entry. The court reasoned that the in-
dictment could be read as alleging an attempt to knowingly enter
the premises because the defendant could not be found guilty of
attempted burglary without finding intent to knowingly enter.68
The court viewed the damage to the building as evidence of the
Furthermore, the judge asserted that the mental state of knowingly damaging the prop-
erty of another had never even been charged. He also found the evidence of attempt
burglary more than circumstantial. Consequently, the justice found no error with the
trial judge's refusal of defendant's tendered instructions. Bryant, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 1017,
476 N.E.2d at 796 (Barry, J., dissenting).
61. Bryant, 113 Il. 2d at 500, 499 N.E.2d 414.
62. Id. at 501, 499 N.E.2d at 414.
63. Id. at 501, 499 N.E.2d at 415. Latent fabric impressions on pieces of glass were
consistent with the impression produced by the shirt discovered near the scene. Id. Also,
shards of glass in Bryant's shoes had the same refractive index as the service station's
window glass. Id.
64. Id. at 505, 499 N.E.2d at 416.
65. The one-count indictment alleged that the defendant: "with the intent to commit
... Burglary in violation of Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, Section 19-1(a), did
perform a substantial step toward the commission of that offense in that he pulled away a
screen and broke a window of a building . . . with the intent to enter said building
without authority, and to commit therein a theft, in violation of paragraph 8-4(a), Chap-
ter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes." Bryant, 113 11. 2d at 504-05, 499 N.E.2d at 416.
66. Id.
67. For the text of the charge, see supra note 65.
68. Bryant, 113 I11. 2d at 505, 499 N.E.2d at 417.
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defendant's substantial step toward the commission of a burglary.
The court, therefore, held that the charging instrument could be
interpreted as containing an implicit allegation that the defendant
knowingly caused damage to property, the element necessary for
conviction of the lesser offense.6 9 The court ruled that the evidence
could have "rationally sustained" an acquittal of the greater of-
fense of burglary and a conviction for the lesser offense of criminal
damage to property. 0
2. Reasonable Theory of Innocence Abolished
Importantly, the court also concluded that the reasonable theory
of innocence instruction should no longer be used."' Paragraph
3.02 of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions provides for a reason-
able theory of innocence test which is to be used when evidence is
strictly circumstantial. 2 The court viewed the instruction as ob-
scure and misleading and refused to find the burden of proof fun-
damentally different in cases in which the evidence of guilt was
entirely circumstantial. 3 Consequently, the court ruled that the
same definitional instruction of reasonable doubt should be used in
all cases regardless of the nature of the evidence presented. 4
D. Statutes Analyzed
1. Use of Deadly Force in Defense of a Dwelling
In People v. Sawyer," the court interpreted Illinois statutory law
permitting the use of deadly force in defense of a dwelling. 6 After
69. Id. at 506, 499 N.E.2d at 417.
70. Id. at 505-06, 499 N.E.2d at 416-17. Instructions on less serious offenses are not
always required. For limits on the operation of the lesser included offense doctrine, see
id. at 507, 499 N.E.2d at 417-18.
71. Id. at 510, 499 N.E.2d at 419.
72. Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) Criminal, No. 3.02 (2d ed. 1981). See
supra note 60. The reasonable theory of innocence charge attempted to express a reason-
able doubt standard in the "vocabulary" of circumstantial evidence; and, in effect, at-
tempted to define reasonable doubt. Id. at 511, 499 N.E.2d at 419.
73. Id. at 511, 499 N.E.2d at 419. The court concluded that the language of the
instruction suggested to juries that a unique standard governed cases in which the evi-
dence of guilt was entirely circumstantial and that the burden of proof was, therefore,
somehow fundamentally different. Id.
74. Id. at 511-12, 499 N.E.2d at 419-20.
75. 115 Il1. 2d 184, 503 N.E.2d 331 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3216 (1987).
76. Illinois law provides that:
A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent
that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or termi-
nate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a dwelling. However, he is
1988]
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retrial," a jury convicted Terrance Sawyer of voluntary man-
slaughter and the trial court sentenced him to the minimum term
of four years.78
In Sawyer, the defendant and victim were acquaintances and ri-
val suitors for the affections of one of the witnesses. 79 Both were
present at their mutual girlfriend's house where a heated discussion
regarding the relationships occurred. 0 The girlfriend-witness
chose the defendant as a suitor and eventually asked the victim to
leave.8 The victim left the house and then re-entered unlawfully,
ignoring instructions to stay out. A scuffle ensued and Sawyer
stabbed the victim to death. 2
The only issue raised on appeal was whether the State had
proved that Sawyer unjustifiably used force in defense of a dwell-
ing.8 3 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the voluntary man-
slaughter conviction, holding the evidence insufficient to support
the defendant's affirmative defense.8 4
The court identified two necessary elements to justify the use of
force in defense of a dwelling. First, the victim's entry must be
"violent," "riotous," or "tumultuous."8 " Second, the defendant
must have a reasonable, subjective belief that deadly force is neces-
sary to prevent "an assault upon, or an offer of personal violence
to," himself or another within the dwelling.86 The court concluded
justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great
bodily harm only if:
(a) The entry is made or attempted in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous
manner, and he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent an
assault upon, or offer of personal violence to him or another then in the dwell-
ing ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 7-2(a) (1985) (emphasis added).
77. The trial court initially granted the defendant a retrial after the court determined
it had improperly refused to give a tendered jury instruction on the use of force in defense
of a dwelling. Sawyer, 115 Ill. 2d at 187, 503 N.E.2d. at 332.
78. Id. at 187, 191, 503 N.E.2d at 332, 334-35. The appellate court agreed that there
was insufficient evidence to justify the defendant's use of force and it affirmed the circuit
court's conviction. 139 11. App. 3d 383, 386, 487 N.E.2d 662, 664 (3d Dist. 1985).
79. Sawyer, 115 111. 2d 187, 503 N.E.2d at 333.
80. Id. at 188, 503 N.E.2d at 333.
81. Id. at 189, 503 N.E.2d at 333.
82. Id. at 189-90, 503 N.E.2d at 333-34.
83. Id. at 187, 503 N.E.2d at 333.
84. Id. at 196-97, 503 N.E.2d at 337. In concluding that the defendant's use of force
was unjustified, the court relied on and quoted ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 7-2(a)
(1983), which is identical to the 1985 statute. For the text of this statute, see supra note
76.
85. Sawyer, 115 Ill. 2d at 192, 503 N.E.2d at 335.
86. Id.
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that the defendant failed to prove both necessary elements.87
Although the victim's re-entry was unlawful, the court found no
evidence that he entered in a "violent, riotous or tumultuous
manner."
88
Regarding the second element, the court concluded that the de-
fendant unreasonably believed that he needed to use deadly force
to prevent assault or personal violence.89 Because the defendant
did not have a reasonable fear of danger, the court affirmed the
jury's voluntary manslaughter conviction 9 and sentence. 91
87. Id. at 196-97, 503 N.E.2d at 337.
88. Id. at 193, 503 N.E.2d at 335. The court clearly distinguished self defense, re-
quiring a defendant's subjective belief of imminent danger to life or threat of great bodily
harm, from defense of dwelling, requiring only a threat of assault or personal violence.
Id. at 193, 503 N.E.2d at 335-36. Both defenses, however, rely on examination of the
facts and circumstances and the reasonableness of the defendant's belief. Id. According
to Illinois Law:
A person is justified in the use of force [in self-defense] ... when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend him-
self or another against . . . imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is
justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great
bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or the commission
of a forcible felony.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 7-1 (1985) (emphasis added). See supra note 76 for text of
statute regarding defense of dwelling.
89. Sawyer, 115 I11. 2d at 196-97, 503 N.E.2d at 337. The court distinguished Sawyer
from People v. Givens, which exonerated the defendant on the grounds of defense of
dwelling despite the absence of any struggle before the killing. Givens, 26 Il. 2d 371, 186
N.E.2d 225 (1962). Givens involved an elderly, partially blind defendant who shot a
stranger after giving warning. Id. at 372-73, 186 N.E.2d at 226. Unlike Sawyer, Givens'
fear of danger from the intrusion was found to be reasonable. Id. at 375-76, 186 N.E.2d
at 227. In Givens, the intruder was thirty-five years old and weighed about 170 pounds,
while the defendant was fifty-nine years old and weighed approximately 130 pounds. The
Givens court concluded that because the defendant was not physically able to repel the
intruder by hand, he reasonably believed that the only way to protect himself and stop
the intruder was to shoot the intruder. Id. Unlike Givens, the defendant and victim in
Sawyer were approximately the same age and weight and had known each other for eight
or nine years. Sawyer, 115 111. 2d at 196, 503 N.E.2d at 337.
90. Having concluded that the defendant's belief in use of deadly force was unreason-
able, the court relied on ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2(b)(1985), to affirm the convic-
tion for voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 197, 503 N.E.2d at 337. The statute provides in
pertinent part:
A person who intentionally or knowingly kills [another] commits voluntary
manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be
such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing.., but his belief
is unreasonable.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2(b)(1985)(emphasis added).
91. In dissent, Justice Simon agreed with the defendant's conviction, but disagreed
with the four-year sentence imposed. Sawyer, 115 I11. 2d at 197, 201, 503 N.E.2d at 337,
339 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Simon asserted that the
court incorrectly assessed the factors in sentencing. The trial judge found only one miti-
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2. Unlawful Use of Weapons
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
the statute regarding the unlawful use of weapons by felons 92 in
People v. Ryan. 93 The defendants, four inmates of the Menard Cor-
rectional Center, were charged with unlawful possession of weap-
ons94 after prison officials discovered homemade weapons in their
respective cells. 95
Section 24-1.1 of the Criminal Code prohibits a felon from
knowingly possessing any weapon prohibited under section 24-1 of
the Code. 96 Section 24-1 of the Code prohibits certain weapons
outright,97 prohibits other weapons only in certain situations,98 and
gating factor. Id. at 197-98, 503 N.E.2d at 337-38. In doing so, Justice Simon charged
the trial judge with rejecting a number of other factors which should have been consid-
ered, such as education, employment history, community activities, and circumstances
which furnished substantial ground to explain and even excuse Sawyer's conduct such as
strong provocation. Id. at 198-99, 503 N.E.2d 338. Instead, the trial judge improperly
considered the supposedly aggravating factor of the need for deterrence and substantially
abused his sentencing discretion. Id. at 200, N.E.2d at 339. Justice Simon asserted that
deterrence was inapplicable because the defendant was convicted for his unreasonable
judgment in the need for deadly force - an offense for which punishment would have little
deterrent effect. Id. Simon asserted that the assessment was so blatantly improper thatjustice required a sua sponte reconsideration of the sentence. Id. at 197, 503 N.E.2d at
337.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1.1 (1985). For the text of this statute, see infra
note 96.
93. 117 II1. 2d 28, 509 N.E.2d 1001 (1987). Ryan consolidated the State's cases
against four felons. The State charged John Ryan, Don Rico Reese, Peter Lee, and Juan
DeJesus, each with unlawful possession of a weapon. Id. at 30-31, 509 N.E.2d at 162-63.
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1.1 (1985). For the text of the statute, see infra
note 96.
95. Ryan, 117 Il1. 2d at 31, 509 N.E.2d at 1001-02.
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1.1 (1985). Section 24-1.1 of the Code provides,
in relevant part, as follows:
(a) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or
on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon prohibited
under Section 24-1 of this Act... if the person has been convicted of a felony
under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction ....
(b) Sentence. Violation of this Section by a person not confined in a penal
institution shall be a Class 3 felony. Any person who violates this Section while
confined in a penal institution ... is guilty of a Class 1 felony, if he possesses
any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1 of this Code regardless of the intent
with which he possesses it, and a Class X felony if he possesses any firearm,
firearm ammunition or explosive.
Id.
97. Id. at para. 24-1(a)(1), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(l 1)(1985). The unlawful weapons
prohibited by these provisions include, among others, any bludgeon, black-jack, sand-
bag, metal knuckles, throwing star, id. at para. 24-1(a)(1), spring gun, id. at para. 24-
l(a)(5), silencer, id. at para. 24-1(a)(6), machine gun, grenade, bottle or other container
containing any explosive, id. at para. 24-1(a)(7), and explosive bullet, id. at para. 24-
l(a)(l 1).
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prohibits other weapons only when carried or possessed "with in-
tent to use the same unlawfully against another." 99 The weapons
allegedly possessed by each of the defendants were included in this
last category. °0
The defendants contended that the statute was unconstitution-
ally vague on its face for two reasons.' 0' First, the statute failed to
provide adequate notice of the specific conduct prohibited. 10 2 Sec-
ond, the statute failed to provide authorities with meaningful gui-
dance for enforcement. 10 3
The defendants found the statute vague because it offered no
clear indication of how or when to apply, within an institutional
setting, the concepts of abode, land, and place of business, which
are used in Section 24.1-1(a) to delimit possession with respect to
felons who are not confined.1°4 The court, however, ruled that the
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(8), (a)(9), (a)(10), (a)(12).
Among the prohibitions are the following: carrying on or about the person or in a vehicle
any object containing noxious liquid gas or substance, id. at para. 24-1(a)(3), any con-
cealed pistol, revolver, stun gun, taser or other firearm, id. at para. 24-1(a)(4), any firearm
in any place licensed to sell intoxicating liquor or at any public gathering, id. at para. 24-
l(a)(8), any firearm when hooded, robed or masked, id. at para. 24-1(a)(10), and any
bludgeon, black-jack, metal knuckles, switchblade, or any object containing noxious liq-
uid gas while on the grounds of any school, college or university, id. at para. 24-1(a)(12).
99. Id. at para. 24-1(a)(2). The pertinent paragraph provides as follows:
(2) Carries or possesses with intent to use the same unlawfully against an-
other, a dagger, dirk, billy, dangerous knife, razor, stiletto, broken bottle or
other piece of glass, stun gun or taser or any other dangerous or deadly weapon
or instrument of like character ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(2)(1985).
100. 117 Ill. 2d at 32, 509 N.E. 2d at 1002. Defendants Ryan, Lee and DeJesus were
each charged with possessing weapons made from a metal rod that was sharpened into
what was described as a dagger, dirk, or pick; and defendant Reese was charged with
possessing two knives, seven inches in length, made from plexiglass. Id. at 31-32, 509
N.E.2d at 1002.
101. Id. at 33, 509 N.E.2d at 1003. The circuit court invalidated the statute at issue,
ruling that the statute was vague and over broad, and that it denied the defendants both
due process and equal protection. Id. at 30-31, 33, 509 N.E.2d at 1001-02. Upon direct
appeal, the supreme court acknowledged that the overbreadth doctrine permitted a party,
who would not otherwise have standing, to attack a penal statute if it involved first
amendment freedoms, but found the doctrine inapplicable in this case because the chal-
lenged provision did not implicate any rights of speech or association or other form of
activity protected by the first amendment. Id. at 33, 509 N.E.2d at 1003. The circuit
court also ruled that the information filed against the four defendants failed to allege an
offense. Id. at 30-31, 36, 509 N.E.2d at 1001-02, 1005. On appeal, in addition to their
constitutional challenge, the defendants continued to plead the insufficiency of informa-
tion filed. Id. at 36-39, 509 N.E.2d at 1004-05. See infra note 113.
102. Id. at 33, 509 N.E.2d at 1003.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 34, 509 N.E.2d at 1003. The defendants questioned whether prison con-
finement included a prisoner being transported from one penal institution to another, or
being treated in a private hospital outside the prison grounds. Id.
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statute must be examined only in light of the specific facts of the
four cases involved. 05 The dangerous wezpons were found in each
defendant's cell, which was a place clearly within the intended
reach of the statute. 0 6 The court consequently ruled that the de-
fendants could not challenge the statute for vagueness because the
statute clearly applied to their conduct. 07
To further support their charge of vagueness, the defendants
questioned the practical application and effect of the statute be-
cause it failed to provide any exemption for otherwise blameless
activity. 08 The court rejected this challenge, reemphasizing that
the weapons had been found in the defendants' cells and that, con-
sequently, their conduct clearly fell within the scope of the
statute. 109
Finally, the defendants proposed that the absence of any require-
ment of unlawful intent with respect to possession of weapons by a
felon in confinement deprived the statute of any "core meaning." 1o
The court held that the provision regarding intent must be ex-
amined with its apparent purpose in mind. " ' In light of the central
objective of prison administration to safeguard institutional secur-
ity, the court concluded that prison officials had an obvious interest
in preventing prisoners' access to weapons." 2 Consequently, the
court ruled that the statute regarding unlawful possession of a
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 34, 509 N.E.2d at 1003. The defendants contended that prisoners working
in the prison kitchen or engaging in recreation on the prison baseball diamond could
technically, but innocently violate the statute. Id. at 35, 509 N.E.2d at 1003. The court
ultimately advised that if the defendants based their challenge on the statute simply be-
cause it prohibited innocent conduct, their complaint should be one of substantive due
process or statutory interpretation, neither one of which had been pleaded. Id. at 36, 509
N.E.2d at 1004.
109. Id. at 35, 509 N.E.2d at 1003-04. Furthermore, two of the defendants acknowl-
edged that they had made the weapons for self protection. Id. at 35, 509 N.E.2d at 1004.
Having engaged in clearly proscribed conduct, a defendant may not complain of vague-
ness of the law as applied to others. Id. (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc. 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)).
110. Id. at 35, 509 N.E.2d at 1004. The court noted that the offense of unlawful use
of weapons requires an unlawful intent when the charge involved possession of a weapon
listed in section 24-1(a)(2). Section 24-1.1(a) incorporated the unlawful intent require-
ment when the felon was not confined in a prison, but section 24-1.1(b) eliminated the
intent requirement with respect to a felon confined in prison at the time of the offense.
Id. at 32, 509 N.E.2d at 1002.
Ill. Id. The court acknowledged that the apparent purpose of the statute was to
prohibit even innocent possession of items that were likely to be hazardous in a penal
setting. Id. at 32-33, 509 N.E.2d at 1002.
112. Id. at 35-36, 509 N.E.2d at 1004.
1988] Criminal Law
weapon by a felon was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
prison inmates. 1 3
3. Aggravated Arson
In People v. Johnson, l 4 the defendant, Gary Johnson, challenged
the constitutionality of the Illinois aggravated arson statute.11 5
The State charged Gary Johnson with aggravated arson, alleging
that he knowingly damaged a building by fire, when he had reason
to know that someone was present within it." 6 The circuit court
held that the statute unconstitutionally violated his due process be-
cause it failed to define the underlying offense which he allegedly
aggravated and dismissed the charge against him. The State then
appealed as a matter of right. 1 7
In deciding the due process challenge to the charge of aggra-
vated arson, the court relied upon its prior reasoning in People v.
Wick." 8 Wick was charged with violating section 20-1.1(a)(3) of
the aggravated arson statute which provided that an offense was
committed when a person knowingly damaged a building by fire
and a fireman or police officer was injured at the scene as a re-
sult."1 9 Wick argued that the statute violated due process and was
113. Id. at 38, 509 N.E.2d at 1005. Regarding the defendants' allegation that the
information filed insufficiently charged an offense, the court ruled that even if the infor-
mation failed to clearly indicate with which subsections of section 24-1.1 the defendants
were being charged, the statute created a single offense that could be committed in a
variety of ways without any requirement of intent. Id. at 37, 509 N.E.2d at 1005. Incor-
rectly citing the edition of the relevant statutory compilation did not prejudice the de-
fendants, and failing to specifically name the prohibited weapons did not violate the
requirement for sufficient notice. Id. at 37-38, 509 N.E.2d at 1004-05.
114. 114 Ill. 2d 69, 499 N.E.2d 470 (1986).
115. The challenged statute provided as follows:
(a) A person commits aggravated arson when by means of fire or explosive he
knowingly damages, partinlly or totally, any building or structure, including
any adjacent building or structure, and (1) he knows or reasonably should know
that one or more persons are present therein or (2) any person suffers great
bxdily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement as a result of the fire or
explosion or (3) a fireman or policeman who is present at the scene acting in the
line of duty, is injured as a result of the fire or explosion.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1 (1983).
116. Johnson, 114 I1. 2d at 69, 499 N.E.2d at 471. Johnson was charged with violat-
ing section 20-1.1(a)(l) of Illinois Revised Statutes (1983). See supra note 115 for perti-
nent text of section 20-1.1(a)(1) of the aggravated arson statute.
117. Johnson, 114 Il. 2d at 69-70, 499 N.E.2d at 471.
118. Id. at 70-71, 73, 499 N.E.2d at 471-72 (citing People v. Wick, 107 I1. 2d 62, 481
N.E.2d 676 (1985)).
119. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 64-65, 481 N.E.2d 676-78 (1985) (citing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 20-1.1(a)(3)(1981)). The 1981 and 1983 statutes are identical. For the text
of the aggravated arson statute, see supra note 115.
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an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the state's police
power. 120
The Wick court determined that the underlying conduct that the
aggravating factors were meant to enhance was not necessarily
criminal in nature; and further, that the statute punished both in-
nocent and culpable conduct. 2 1 The court believed that the lesser
offense of simple arson required proof of a greater mental state
than the offense of aggravated arson. 2 2 Because the statute failed
to require culpable intent, the court held the statute
unconstitutional. 23
In Johnson, the State attempted to distinguish Wick by arguing
that culpable intent was inherent in Johnson's crime because the
basis of a subsection I offense was damaging a building with
knowledge that a person or persons were present within. 24 The
State contended that such an act could not be innocent, but the
court remained unpersuaded.12
5
Although the court conceded that the involved offense was in-
herently culpable, it held culpability alone insufficient to overcome
the controlling defect in the aggravated arson statute challenged in
Wick.' 26 Because the legislature failed to define the underlying of-
120. Wick, 107 I1. 2d at 65, 481 N.E.2d at 678.
121. Id. at 66, 481 N.E.2d at 678. The statute did not require an unlawful purpose in
setting a fire. Id. For the pertinent text of section 20-1.1(a)(3), see supra note 115.
122. Wick, 107 I1. 2d at 65, 481 N.E.2d at 678. Although simple arson required an
unlawful purpose of knowingly damaging property without consent or of fraudulently
damaging property, aggravated arson did not. Id.
123. Id. at 67, 481 N.E.2d at 679. The Wick court held section 20-1.1(a)(3) of the
aggravated arson statute unconstitutionally broad and ruled that the legislative exercise
of police power did not meet the requirement of due process because the provision was
not reasonably related to protecting an identifiable public interest. Id. at 66-67, 481
N.E.2d at 678-79. The court, however, did not rule on the validity of subsections 20-
1.1(a)l or 20-1.1(a)(2). Id. at 67-68, 481 N.E.2d at 679. For the text of section 20-
1. l(a)(3), see supra note 115. For further discussion of the Wick opinion, see Rogers and
Wetzel, Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 435, 446-47
(1986).
124. Johnson, 114 11. 2d at 71, 499 N.E.2d at 472.
125. Id. at 70-71, 499 N.E.2d at 471. The court contrasted simple arson with aggra-
vated arson and concluded that simple arson, a class 2 felony, required a higher degree of
malice or unlawfulness than did aggravated arson, a Class X felony. Id. Section 20-1
defines arson, in pertinent part as follows:
A person commits arson when, by means of fire or explosive, he knowingly:
(a) Damages any real property, or any personal property having a value of
$150 or more, of another without his consent or
(b) With intent to defraud an insurer, damages any property or any per-
sonal property having a value of $150 or more.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1 (1985).
126. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 72, 499 N.E.2d at 472.
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fense that is aggravated under section 20-1.1(a)(1), the court de-
clared the Wick reasoning controlling and held subsection (a)(1) of
the aggravated arson statute unconstitutional. 27
In People v. Clark, 28 the trial court found Dexter Clark guilty of
aggravated arson, 129 arson, 3 0 and possession of an incendiary de-
vice.' 3' For purposes of sentencing, the arson conviction and the
aggravated arson conviction merged and the defendant received a
fifteen-year prison term for aggravated arson and a concurrent
three-year prison term for possession of an incendiary device. 3 2
The defendant contended that his conviction for aggravated arson
127. Id. at 72-73, 499 N.E.2d at 472. See also People v. Dukes, 146 Ill. App. 3d 790,
497 N.E.2d 351 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 113 II1. 2d. 563 (1986); People v. Lekas,
155 Il. App. 3d 391, 508 N.E.2d 221 (1st Dist. 1987); People v. Orr, 149 Il1. App. 3d 348,
500 N.E.2d 665 (1st Dist. 1986), rehearing denied, 515 N.E.2d 120 (1987) (each constru-
ing constitutionality of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1(a)(1)). In Johnson, the court
recognized that the General Assembly had amended the aggravated arson statute since
the initial judgment had been entered. However, the court explicitly refused to express
any opinion as to the amendment's validity. Johnson, 114 Il. 2d at 72-73, 499 N.E.2d at
472. Codified as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1 (1985), the amendment attempted
to cure the defect noted in Wick by defining the underlying offense of arson and only then
following-up with three subsections to aggravate the conduct. Aggravated arson is now
defined as follows:
(a) A person commits aggravated arson when in the course of committing ar-
son he knowingly damages, partially or totally, any building or structure, in-
cluding any adjacent building or structure, and (1) he knows or reasonably
should know that one or more persons are present therein or (2) any person
suffers great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement as a result of
the fire or explosion or (3) a fireman or policeman who is present at the scene
acting in the line of duty, is injured as a result of the fire or explosion.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1 (amended 1985) (emphasis added). For a general
discussion of the 1985 amendment, see Rogers & Wetzel, Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois
Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 435, 460 (1986).
128. 114 11. 2d 450, 501 N.E.2d 123 (1986).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1(a) (1983). See supra note 115 for the text
of the statute. Clark was charged with violating the 1981 version of the statute which
was identical to the 1983 statute cited. The Johnson court subsequently held section 20-
1.1(a)(1) unconstitutional. For the text of the statute as amended, see supra note 127.
For a discussion of Johnson, see supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1 (1985). For the text of paragraph 20-1, see
supra note 125.
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-2 (1985). The pertinent section provides as
follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of possession of explosives or explosive or
incendiary devices in violation of this Section when he possesses, manufactures
or transports any explosive compound, timing or detonating device for use with
any explosive compound or incendiary device and either intends to use such
explosive or device to commit any offense or knows that another intends to use
such explosive or device to commit a felony.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-2(a)(1985).
132. Clark, 114 Il. 2d at 452, 501 N.E.2d at 124. The appellate court affirmed both
the conviction and the sentence. Id.
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must be reversed because the court had subsequently held section
20-1.1 (a)(1) of the statute unconstitutional in People v. Johnson.1 33
The supreme court agreed, and declared that the conviction was
based on an invalid statute.13 4 Consequently, the court reversed
the conviction for aggravated arson and remanded for re-sentenc-
ing because the arson conviction had been merged with the convic-
tion under an aggravated arson statute subsequently declared
unconstitutional.135
4. Penalty Provision for Look-Alike Substances
People v. Upton 136 challenged the validity of section 1404 of the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act. 3 7  In Upton, a jury convicted
133. Id. at 460, 501 N.E.2d at 127. For a discussion of Johnson, see supra notes 114-
27 and accompanying text.
134. Id. The court affirmed the arson conviction and the conviction and sentence for
possession of an incendiary device. Id. at 461, 501 N.E.2d at 128. The court noted "in
passing" that the aggravated arson statute had been amended to correct the constitutional
deficiencies. It held the amendment was irrelevant, however, because the defendant had
been charged with violating the former version of the statute. Id. at 460, 501 N.E.2d at
128. For the text of the amended statute, see supra note 127.
135. Clark, 114 Ill. 2d at 460-61, 501 N.E.2d at 127-28.
136. 114 Ill. 2d 362, 500 N.E.2d 943 (1986).
137. Id. at 364, 500 N.E.2d at 944. The challenged section provided, in relevant part,
as follows:
(b) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, distribute, ad-
vertise, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute a look-alike sub-
stance. Any person who violates this subsection (b) shall be guilty of a Class 3
felony, the fine for which shall not exceed $20,000.
(c) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to possess a look-alike sub-
stance. Any person who violates this subsection (c) is guilty of a petty offense.
Any person convicted of a subsequent offense under this subsection (c) shall be
guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.
(d) In any prosecution brought under this Section, it is not a defense to a
violation of this Section that the defendant believed the look-alike substance
actually to be a controlled substance.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1404 (Supp. 1982).
The challenged statute in Upton emanated from an earlier "misrepresentation" statute
which penalized the sale of a non-narcotic substance, that was represented to be a nar-
cotic, with a penalty of one to ten years imprisonment; whereas the penalty for actual sale
carried a term of ten years to life. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 22-40 (1961).
In 1973, the legislature amended this statute to penalize look-alike misrepresentation
offenses more severely than actual narcotic offenses. As a result, the fraudulent sale of a
controlled substance was penalized as a Class 3 felony with a potential $15,000 fine. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 56 I/2, para. 1404 (1973). The penalty equalled that for the sale of a
Schedule III controlled substance. Id. at para. 1401 (d). The penalties for Schedule IV
or V substances were less severe; each punishable as a Class 4 felony with a potential
$10,000 or $5,000 fine. Id. at para. 1401(e)(f).
In 1981, the legislature again amended the relevant statutes. Misrepresentation of-
fenses continued to carry greater potential fines than did actual controlled substance of-
fenses. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch 56 '/, paras. 1401(f)(g), 1402(b), and 1404 (1981).
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the defendant of three separate counts of unlawful distribution of
look-alike substances. 38 On appeal, Lori Upton claimed that her
conviction resulted from the application of an unconstitutional
statutory scheme which violated due process by providing for a
harsher potential penalty than would have been imposed for deliv-
ery of real controlled substances. 39
The supreme court declared the provision constitutional."4 The
court acknowledged that the penalty provision in Upton was virtu-
ally identical to a provision that it recently held violated due pro-
cess in People v. Wagner.14' The court, however, distinguished the
statute in Upton from the statute in Wagner and sustained the con-
stitutionality of the statute. 42 In response to Wagner, th(: legisla-
ture amended the statute, and included a preamble that explained
and justified the retained penalty disparity. 43 The court concluded
138. Upton, 114 Ill. 2d at 366, 500 N.E.2d at 945. The jury sentenced the defendant
to one year of conditional discharge and imposed a one hundred dollar fine on each count
plus court costs and restitution. Id.
139. Id. at 364, 500 N.E.2d at 944. The challenged provision of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act punished delivery of a non-controlled look-alike substance with a fine of up to
$220,000. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 '/2, para. 1404(b) (Supp. 1982). Section 1401 of the act,
however, punished delivery of controlled substances with either a $5,000, $10,000, or
$15,000 fine. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401 (e),(f),(g) (Supp. 1982).
After the defendant's conviction but before her appeal, the Legislature, again amended
sections 1404 and 1401 of the Controlled Substances Act. Section 1404, as amended,
punished delivery of a non-controlled look-alike substance as a Class 3 felony with a fine
of up to $150,000. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 56 '/2, para. 1404 (b)(1985). Section 1401, as
amended, punished delivery of a controlled substance as a Class 3 felony with a fine of
either $75,000, $100,000, or $125,000. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 '/2, para. 1401 (e),(f),(g)
(1985).
140. Upton, 114 II1. 2d at 375, 500 N.E.2d at 949.
141. 89 I11. 2d 308, 433 N.E.2d 267 (1982). The issue in Wagner concerned the dis-
parity between penalties for the sale of controlled and non-controlled substances. The
challenged statute in Wagner punished delivery of a non-controlled, look-alike substance
as a Class 3 felony permitting a $15,000 fine. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1404
(1977). On the other hand, the statute punished delivery or possession of a controlled
substance as a Class 3 or 4 felony permitting a $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000 fine. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch 56 1/2, para. 1401 (d),(e),(f) (1977). The court held that the penalty vio-
lated due process because the provisions were not reasonably designed to remedy the evil
determined by the legislature to be the greater threat to the public. Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d at
313, 433 N.E.2d at 270.
142. Upton, 114 I11. 2d at 373, 376, 500 N.E.2d 948-49.
143. The preamble explicitly recognized that the manufacture, delivery, and posses-
sion of look-alike substances carried special dangers and greater harm to users than the
manufacture, delivery and possession of prohibited narcotic substances. Upton, 114 I11.
2d at 370-71, 500 N.E.2d at 947. See also Rogers & Wetzel, Criminal Law 1985-86 Illi-
nois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CH. L.J., 435, 450 (1986). The court also concluded that,
unlike Wagner, the penalty provisions in Upton did not directly contradict the declared
legislative intent. Upton, 114 I11. 2d at 373, 500 N.E.2d at 948.
The Upton court further recognized three important changes enacted by amendments
to the statute after Wagner. These changes were as follows: (1) A lengthy definition of
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that the justifications for the penalty disparity were substantially
and rationally related to the larger objectives of the Illinois Con-
trolled Substances Act of preventing drug traffic and drug abuse.'44
5. Eavesdropping
The Illinois Supreme Court announced a broad interpretation of
the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute 45 in People v. Beardsley.' In
Beardsley, the police stopped the defendant for speeding and ar-
rested him after he refused to tender his license before speaking
with counsel. 47 While sitting in a squad car with two officers
awaiting a tow truck, the defendant taped the officers' conversa-
tion. Neither officer consented to the recording, and both indi-
cated that they were unaware of the taping but knew that the
defendant possessed a tape recorder. 148  A jury found Beardsley
guilty of speeding and eavesdropping. 149
Relying on the common law definition of the offense, the com-
mon meaning of the term "eavesdropping," and the court's deci-
sion in People v. Klingenberg,50 Beardsley contended that
look-alike substances broadened the category of proscribed substances. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 56 'A, para. 1102(z)(Supp. 1982). (2) Simple possession of a look-alike substance be-
came a petty offense. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1404 (c) (Supp. 1982). (3) Penalty
provisions retained and actually increased the disparity between maximum fines for look-
alike substances and actual narcotic substances. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 'A, para. 1404
(Supp. 1982). Upton, 114 Ill. 2d at 367-70, 500 N.E.2d at 945-47.
144. Upton, 114 Ill. 2d at 374-75, 500 N.E.2d at 949. The "rationally related" justifi-
cations for the penalty disparity included the following: (1) look-alike drugs caused more
overdoses either because of their more prevalent impurities or because they lead users to
miscalculate dosages of actual narcotics; (2) dealers plausibly made greater profit and
thus would be deterred only by greater penalties. Id.
The court further declared that due process did not require a precise ratio between two
sets of penalties. Upton, 114 Ill. 2d at 376, 500 N.E.2d at 950.
145. The pertinent provision of the statute at issue provided that:
A person commits eavesdropping when he (a) Uses an eavesdropping device to
... record all or any part of any conversation unless he does so (1) with the
consent of all of the parties to such conversation or (2) with the consent of any
one party... in accordance with Article 108A of the "Code of Criminal Proce-
dure of 1963 ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 14-2 (1985).
146. 115 Ill. 2d 47, 503 N.E.2d 346 (1986). Beardsley presented a rather unusual set
of facts. The issue in eavesdropping cases usually involves the question of whether to
permit law enforcement authorities to wire-tap.
147. Id. at 48-49, 503 N.E.2d at 347-48.
148. Id. at 49, 503 N.E.2d at 348.
149. Id. at 48, 503 N.E.2d at 347. Beardsley received a seventy-five dollar fine for
speeding, a five hundred dollar fine for eavesdropping, and twelve months probation with
ten hours of public service. Id.
150. 34 Ill. App. 3d 705, 339 N.E.2d 456 (1975) (recording defendant's voice during
custodial interrogation after the defendant was arrested and charged with driving while
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eavesdropping can occur only when a conversation is intended by
the declarant to be private.' On the other hand, the State relied
on the plain language of the statute, the principles of statutory con-
struction, and the court's decision in People v. Kurth,1 52 and con-
tended that eavesdropping occurs when a conversation is recorded
without the consent of all parties.1 53
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and con-
cluded that the statute's intent was to protect individuals from the
surreptitious monitoring of their conversations by eavesdropping
devices.' 5 4 It declared that the critical factor in determining the
offense of eavesdropping was whether the complainant ever in-
tended the conversation to be private under circumstances that jus-
tified an expectation of privacy.' 55 The court ruled that no
violation of the eavesdropping statute occurred when the conversa-
tion was recorded by a third party to the conversation or by one
who was knowingly present during the conversation.156
The court determined that the officers did not intend their con-
under the influence was not eavesdropping within the meaning of the statute). The
Klingenberg court commented that the generally accepted definition of eavesdropping
was "to listen secretly to what is said in private." Id. at 707, 339 N.E.2d at 458. The
court also acknowledged the common law definition as "stand[ing] under the eaves of
another home to enable one to hear what was said within the privacy of the home." Id.
See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, art. 14 Committee Comments, at 581 (Smith-Hurd
1972).
151. Beardsley, 115 Ill. 2d at 51, 503 N.E.2d at 349. The legislature supports this
conclusion through its committee comments which state that the statute's primary pur-
pose and intent was to protect an individual's privacy. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 14
committee comments, at 606-07 (1961)(revised 1972).
152. 34 IM. 2d 387, 216 N.E.2d 154 (1975). Kurth held that an unknown, surrepti-
tious recording of a conversation could not be used as evidence against any party who
had not consented to the recording or playing of his conversation. Id. at 395, 216 N.E.2d
158. The issue, however, did not involve whether the conduct itself was criminal. The
statute construed in Kurth provided, in relevant part, that a person committed eavesdrop-
ping when he "use[d] an eavesdropping device to hear or record all or any part of any
conversation without the consent of any party thereto ...." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 14-2(a) (1965). The statute was subsequently amended requiring that the hearing or
recording be with the consent of all parties. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 14-2(a)(1985).
For the text of the amended statute, see supra note 145.
153. Beardsley, 115 11. 2d at 51, 503 N.E.2d at 348.
154. Id. at 53, 503 N.E.2d at 349.
155. Id. at 54, 503 N.E.2d at 350. To clarify the dimensions of the term "expectation
of privacy," the court relied, in part, on the rationale of Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427 (1963). In Lopez, the Court concluded that the government had not used an elec-
tronic device to record a conversation it could not have otherwise heard because its agent
was a participant and fully entitled to disclose the conversation. The electronic device
used merely provided the most reliable evidence of the conversation possible. Id. at 439.
156. Beardsley, 115 I1. 2d at 56, 503 N.E.2d at 351. The court noted the amended
version of the statute brought it into conformity with the court's holding in Kurth. Id. at
58, 503 N.E.2d at 352.
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versation to be private, because they not only spoke in the presence
of the defendant, but they also knew that the defendant possessed a
tape recorder and they made no attempt to seize the recorder until
the defendant was incarcerated. 157 Because the defendant had not
listened secretly to a private conversation and had not surrepti-
tiously obtained information otherwise inaccessible to him, the
court reversed his conviction. 58
6. Chemical Blood Analysis for DUI Charges
The supreme court ruled upon the admissibility of chemical
analysis relating to the changes of driving while under the influence
("DUI") and reckless homicide in People v. Emrich.1 59 Joseph Em-
rich was involved in an early morning automobile collision in
which two people were killed. He was subsequently indicted on
two counts of reckless homicide and one count of driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. 6°
The defendant moved to suppress the admission of a chemical
blood analysis taken after the collision because the blood had not
been mixed with an anticoagulant or preservative as required by
Public Health standards. 61 The circuit court suppressed the anal-
157. Id. at 54, 503 N.E.2d at 350. The court suggested that if the officers intended
their conversation to be private, they would have left the squad car. Id.
158. Id. at 58-59, 503 N.E.2d at 352. Consequently, the court overruled Kurth to the
extent it would have ruled the defendant violated the statute by not having the consent of
all parties present. Id. at 59, 503 N.E.2d at 352. The court, however, hastened to add
that it may not have made the same decision if the defendant had been equipped with a
transmitter instead of a recorder. The court intimated that it may have judged the trans-
mission of the conversation as an impermissible interception. Id. Justice Simon wrote a
specially concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Clark. Justice Simon agreed with
the reversal, but only on the basis of the officer's implied consent to the recording itself.
Id. at 64, 503 N.E.2d at 354 (Simon, J., specially concurring). Justice Simon believed the
majority's opinion ignored amendatory language, ignored the history of the statute, and
ignored the requirement for the consent of all parties present to the conversation. Id. at
59-60, 64, 503 N.E.2d at 352, 355 (Simon, J., specially concurring). He asserted that the
majority ignored the manifest legislative intent and damaged the statute's probable cause
requirement which permits recording with the consent of one party, only if coupled with
a court order obtained in certain circumstances. Id. at 62, 64-65, 503 N.E.2d at 354-55
(Simon, J., specially concurring). Justice Simon contended that the statute intends that
one must have the consent of all parties before one can record a conversation without a
court order. Id. at 59, 503 N.E.2d at 352 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
159. 113 Ill. 2d 343, 498 N.E.2d 1140 (1986).
160. Id. at 345, 498 N.E.2d at 1141.
161. Id. at 346-47, 498 N.E.2d at 1142. ILL. Rlv. STAT. ch. 95 12 , para. 11-501.2
provides in relevant part:
Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of an
arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11-501 ... evidence of the concentra-
tion of alcohol, other drug or combination.., in a person's blood or breath at
the time alleged, as determined by analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath
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ysis because the State's failure to maintain properly the blood sam-
ple resulted in spoilation and violated the defendant's due process
by denying him an opportunity for an independent analysis.1 62
On appeal, the defendant argued that both the DUI and reckless
homicide charges should have been dropped because the evidence
failed to meet the requisite standards governing DUI evidence . 63
In addition, the defendant claimed that by failing to add an antico-
agulant, the State failed to maintain a proper sample for an in-
dependent evaluation and had, therefore, denied him due
process. 164
In a unanimous decision, the supreme court affirmed the sup-
pression of the chemical analysis for the DUI charge. 6 The court,
however, reversed the suppression of evidence in the two reckless
homicide charges.'6 The court ruled that the statute governing
blood analyses applied only to prosecutions for DUI and held that
or other bodily substance, shall be admissible. Where such test is made the
following provision shall apply:
I. Chemical analyses... to be considered valid ... shall have been per-
formed according to standards promulgated by the Department of Public
Health in consultation with the Department of Law Enforcement by an individ-
ual possessing a valid permit ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.2(a)(1) (1985).
The Department of Public Health provided that "when vacuum-type blood-collecting
containers are ... used as primary collecting tubes, two (2) tubes should be collected
each containing an anticoagulant/preservative which will not interfere with the intended
analytical method." Emrich, 113 11. 2d at 348, 498 N.E.2d at 1142 (citing Rule
I 1.01(d)(3) of the Dept. of Public Health Standards and Procedures for Testing of
Breath, Blood and Urine for Alcohol and/or Other Drugs (1982)). See also People v.
Orth, 154 Ill. App. 3d 144, 506 N.E.2d 960 (1987), cert. denied. (once results of
breathalyzer tests are used in driver's license suspension hearing, evidence the test was
performed according to the Department of Health's uniform standard; and that the
machine was regularly tested for accuracy are necessary elements of foundation for ad-
mission). Id. at 147-48, 506 N.E.2d at 963.
In a recent decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the testing standards of sec-
tion 11-501.2 apply to summary suspension proceedings and that licensees may challenge
a summary suspension by alleging noncompliance with these standards at a rescissionary
hearing. See People v. Hamilton, 118 I11. 2d 153, 160-61, 514 N.E.2d 965, 970 (1987). A
licensee may petition for a rescissionary hearing pursuant to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 /2,
para. 2-118.1 (1985)
162. Emrich, 113 Ill. 2d at 347-48, 498 N.E.2d at 1142. The appellate court affirmed,
but never reached the due process issue. Instead the court specifically relied on the fail-
ure to add an anticoagulant and interpreted the mandatory language regarding the chem-
ical analysis standards of section 11-501.2 applicable to both reckless homicide and DUI
prosecutions suppressing the blood analysis with respect to all counts. Emrich, 132 Ill.
App. 3d 547, 551-52, 478 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1985).
163. Emrich, 113 I11. 2d at 351-52, 498 N.E.2d at 1144.
164. Id. at 353, 498 N.E.2d at 1144.
165. Id. at 351, 498 N.E.2d at 1143.
166. Id. at 351, 498 N.E.2d at 1144.
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the terms of the statute did not apply to evidence introduced in
reckless homicide cases. 67 Rather, chemical blood analysis offered
as proof in reckless homicide cases must comply only with "ordi-
nary standards of admissibility."' 68 Consequently, the court re-
manded the case for a finding of fact about the accuracy of the
chemical blood analysis. 6 9
7. The Seat Belt Statute
In a per curiam decision, the Illinois Supreme Court consoli-
dated four cases' 70 upon direct appeal and considered the constitu-
tionality of the seat belt statute in People v. Kohrig. 17' The court
refused to rule on either the desirability or necessity of the law.
167. Id.
168. Id. To reach this conclusion, the court relied on its reasoning in People v. Mur-
phy, 108 11. 2d 228, 483 N.E.2d 1288 (1985), which held, that with respect to reckless
homicide charges, evidentiary blood analysis must meet the ordinary test of admissibility.
Id. In Murphy, like Emrich, blood analysis was ruled admissible despite the absence of
an anticoagulant. Unlike Emrich, however, the Murphy court had no doubt about the
test's validity and accuracy. In Emrich, not only was there a conflict about the test's
validity, but there was no finding about its accuracy. Emrich, 113 Ill. 2d at 352, 498
N.E.2d at 1144. For a more detailed discussion of People v. Murphy, see Rogers & Wet-
zel, Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 435, 448-49 (1986).
169. Id. at 353, 498 N.E.2d at 1144. In addition the court rejected the defendant's
due process claim as meritless. Id. at 353-54, 498 N.E.2d at 1145. The court held that
the State's failure to preserve a blood sample for the defendant's independent testing did
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 354, 498 N.E.2d at 1145. In
rejecting the due process claim, the court relied on California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479
(1984), and concluded that the defendant failed to prove two essential requirements:
(1) that the evidence possessed an exculpatory value that was apparent before its destruc-
tion and (2) that the evidence was of such a nature that defendant was unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Emrich, 113 111. 2d at 353-54,
498 N.E.2d at 1145.
170. In each case, the police charged the defendant with failing to wear a seat belt
while operating an automobile on a public street or highway. The circuit courts of
Marion, Effingham, Fayette, and Champaign Counties each held the statute to be uncon-
stitutional and dismissed the charges. People v. Kohrig, 113 Il. 2d 384, 389-91, 498
N.E.2d 1158, 1158-59 (1986).
171. 113 Ill. 2d 391, 498 N.E.2d 1159 (1986). The seat belt statute provides, in rele-
vant part, as follows:
(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or
highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/,, para. 12.603.1(a)(1985).
The statute also provides for certain persons to be exempt from the seat belt use re-
quirement. The following persons and vehicles are exempt:
1. A driver or passenger frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or de-
livering . . . from the vehicle, if the speed between stops does not exceed 15
miles per hour.
2. A driver or passenger possessing a written statement from a physician
[relating inability] for medical or physical reasons ....
3. A driver or passenger possessing an official certificate or license endorse-
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Rather, the court concentrated on whether the statute violated a
fundamental right of privacy as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment and on whether the statute violated the due process
clauses of the state and federal constitutions by going beyond the
police powers of the state.172
Reviewing United States Supreme Court precedent, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the Illinois seat belt law did not violate
any fundamental constitutional right or privilege.1 73  Without a
fundamental constitutional right or liberty implicated, the court
concluded that the statute was not subject to strict scrutiny and the
state need only show a rational relation between the statute and a
legitimate legislative purpose. 74 Applying the rational relation
ment issued by the appropriate agency in another state or county indicating...
[inability] for medical, physical, or other valid reasons....
4. A driver operating a motor vehicle in reverse.
5. A motor vehicle ... [manufactured] ... prior to 1965.
6. A motorcycle or motor driven cycle.
7. A motorized pedal cycle.
8. A motor vehicle ... not required to be equipped with seat safety belts
under federal law.
9. A motor vehicle operated by a rural letter carrier ... while performing
duties....
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 12-603.1(b)(1) to (b)(9) (1985).
Although a failure to wear a seat belt is not to be considered evidence of negligence nor
a limitation of liability of an insurer or of recovery for relevant damages, a violation is
deemed a petty offense subject to a maximum fine of twenty-five dollars. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch 95 1/2, para. 12-603.1(c)(d) (1985).
172. Kohrig, 113 I11. 2d at 392-93, 498 N.E.2d at 1160 (citing U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 2; ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 6).
173. Id. at 394-96, 498 N.E.2d at 1161-62. The court disagreed with the conclusion
that the right to decide whether to wear a seat belt is either a right implicit in our concept
of liberty or justice or a liberty deeply rooted in the country's history. Id. at 395, 498
N.E.2d at 1161. The court found no "textual basis" or "clear historical precedent" for
the right to wear a seat belt within the language of either the United States or Illinois
constitutions, and refused to act as a "super-legislature." Id. at 396, 498 N.E.2d at 1162.
The court stated that it was unwilling to "graft onto the Constitution" a right of privacy
because to do so would place the court in the position of acting as a super-legislature,
nullifying laws it did not like. Id.
174. Id. at 397-98, 498 N.E.2d at 1162-63. Relying on People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446,
250 N.E.2d 149 (1969), which held the statute requiring motorcycle drivers and passen-
gers to wear protective helmets unconstitutional, the defendant argued that the decision
to wear a seat belt, like the decision to wear a helmet, was "essentially a matter of per-
sonal safety." Kohrig, 113 I11. 2d at 398, 498 N.E.2d at 1163. The State presented and
the court cited a host of persuasive authorities holding helmet laws constitutional. Id. at
398-400, 498 N.E.2d at 1163. The State noted that the overwhelming weight of authority
upheld motorcycle-helmet laws as a valid exercise of the State's police powers and per-
suasively urged the court to overrule the Fries decision. Id. at 398, 498 N.E.2d at 1163.
The supreme court subsequently distinguished Fries and held that the helmet statute,
unlike the seat belt statute, was designed only to protect individuals (motorcycle opera-
tors and passengers) rather than the general public. Id. at 400, 498 N.E.2d at 1163. The
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test, '75 the court concluded that the Illinois legislature had several
legitimate interests in requiring the seat belt law. 76 First, the state
has an interest in protecting persons other than seat belt wearers by
aiding drivers to maintain control of their cars. 77  Second, the
state has an interest in promoting economic welfare by reducing
public and private costs associated with serious automobile-related
injuries and deaths.1 78 Mindful of the state's broad power to
provide for the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens, the court
concluded that the seat belt law is rationally related to public
safety and, further, that it promotes the state's economic wel-
fare. 179  Accordingly, the court declared the statute con-
stitutional. 80
8. Disqualification of Reinstatement of Summary Statutory
Suspension of Driving Privileges
In People v. O'Donnell,8' the supreme court reviewed the consti-
tutionality of certain provisions of the Illinois driver's license sum-
mary suspension and reinstatement procedure. In May, 1986, a
trial court declared certain provisions of the statute'8 2 unconstitu-
court conceded that the primary goal of the statute at issue was to protect the individual
driver and front-seat passenger. It also noted, however, that the law's primary objective
was not controlling as long as the law bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative
purpose. Id.
175. When a statute implicates a fundamental right or liberty interest, the statute is
subjected to strict scrutiny and the State must show a compelling interest which overrides
that right. When no fundamental right or liberty is implicated, however, the law will be
upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is not arbitrary
or discriminatory. Under this test, a statute is presumed valid and the challenger bears
the burden of proof. Id. at 397-98, 498 N.E.2d at 1162-63.
176. Id. at 400-05, 498 N.E.2d at 1164-66.
177. Id. at 400, 402, 498 N.E.2d at 1164-65.
178. Id. at 400, 403-05, 498 N.E.2d at 1165-66.
179. Id. The court reviewed significant parts of legislative debates indicating a legiti-
mate legislative inten* to protect and promote public safety and economic welfare. Id. at
400-01, 403-04, 498 N.E.2d at 1164-65. The court further held irrelevant the interpreta-
tion of empirical evidence to support or deny the law's effectiveness. Evidentiary discov-
ery and interpretation are properly the subject for the legislature and not the courts. Id.
at 405-06, 498 N.E.2d at 1166.
180. Id. at 406, 498 N.E.2d at 1166. The court overruled Fries to the extent that it
was inconsistent with its finding of validity. Id.
181. 116 I11. 2d 517, 508 N.E.2d 1066 (1987). The court considered the challenge
upon direct appeal by the Secretary of State. Id.
182. A 1985 state law imposes virtually automatic driver's license suspensions for
drunken-driving. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 '/2, para. 11-501.1.(1985). In People v. Flores,
155 Il1. App. 3d 964, 508 N.E.2d 1132 (1987), the court upheld the statute providing for
summary suspension of drivers who either refuse to submit to a breathalyzer test or of
drivers who fail the test. Id. at 969-70, 508 N.E.2d at 1135-36. The court concluded that
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tional on two grounds.8 3 First, the trial court found to be uncon-
stitutionally vague a phrase directing reinstatement of driving
privileges after a summary suspension "unless the court has evi-
dence that the person should be disqualified.' 84  The court
reached its opinion of unconstitutional vagueness after concluding
that the statute completely failed to provide any procedures or
guidelines in determining whether a driver's privileges should be
restored.8 5 The trial court found that the section did not enumer-
ate the grounds for disqualification 86 and, that the section did not
reveal what evidence could be considered. 8 7 Finally, the section
did not indicate who, if anyone, should present the evidence. 88
Second, the trial court struck down a provision that directed the
circuit court to forward reinstatement fees to the Secretary of
State. It held the provision unconstitutional as a violation of the
separation of powers.8 9
The supreme court reversed and ruled both provisions constitu-
tional.19° The court first concluded that the charge of vagueness
was meritless, and held that the challenged provision was, as a
whole, clear enough to permit uniform enforcement.1 91 The court
found no evidence that the reinstatement provision typically in-
volved either judicial discretion or ex parte inquiry.1 92 Rather, the
the statute serves the state's strong and substantial interest in removing intoxicated driv-
ers from its highways and provides a basis for equal treatment of drivers. Id.
In a recent decision, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed the state's authority to im-
pose summary drivers' license suspensions and struck down a claim that the DUI law
unfairly discriminated between alcohol impaired drivers and those under the influence of
drugs. See People v. Cheryl A. Esposito, No. 63868, slip op. at 6-7 (March 23, 1988).
183. O'Donnell, 116 Ill. 2d at 520, 508 N.E.2d at 1067. The specific provisions at
issue state, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) Following a statutory summary suspension of the privilege to drive...
the circuit court of venue shall restore full driving privileges when all appropri-
ate fees are paid unless the court has evidence that the person should be disqual-
ified, ... the court shall notify the Secretary of State.
(c) Full driving privileges may not be restored until all applicable reinstate-
ment fees.... have been paid to the circuit court and forwarded to the Secre-
tary of State.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 I/2, para. 6-208.1(b)(c) (1985).
184. O'Donnell, 116 Ill. 2d at 521, 508 N.E.2d at 1067-68.
185. Id. at 521, 508 N.E.2d at 1068.
186. Id. at 522, 508 N.E.2d at 1068.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 521-22, 508 N.E.2d at 1068.
189. Id. at 525, 508 N.E.2d at 1070. For text of the challenged provision, see supra
note 183.
190. Id. at 528, 508 N.E.2d at 1071.
191. Id. at 523, 508 N.E.2d at 1068-69.
192. Id. at 524, 508 N.E.2d at 1069.
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court determined that although the specific grounds for disqualifi-
cation were not enumerated, they could be discovered by reference
to other provisions within the statute that clearly enumerated
grounds for suspension and revocation. 93 Regarding the presenta-
tion of evidence, the court acknowledged that according to the gen-
eral terms of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the States Attorney would
present any evidence against reinstatement. 94 In addition, the
court viewed a recent modification in statutory language as a clari-
fication of the provision challenged and held that the court's inter-
pretation was consistent with the newly stated intent.'19
Regarding the second challenge to the reinstatement provision,
the court concluded that the doctrine of separation of powers did
not apply. 96 The court held that the collection and forwarding of
fees was a routine and ministerial task and merely an example of
interbranch communication and administrative cooperation. 97
The court further held that the constitution did not mandate a
complete divorce of the three branches of government and did not
prohibit any such cooperative arrangement. 98
9. Highway Solicitation
In People v. Tosch, 99 the State charged Susan Tosch with high-
way solicitation. 200 At trial, the court declared the solicitation stat-
193. Id. at 524-25, 508 N.E.2d at 1069 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6-205,
6-206, (1985) (relating to circumstances meriting mandatory revocation of a license or
permit in hardship cases and relating to discretionary authority to suspend or revoke a
license or permit with right to a hearing)).
194. O'Donnell, 116 Ill. 2d at 524, 508 N.E.2d at 1069. The general duties of the
State's Attorney are set out in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, para. 5 (1985). The State's Attor-
ney is required to prosecute violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code by provisions con-
tained in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 16-102 (1985).
195. O'Donnell, 116 Il. 2d at 525, 508 N.E.2d at 1069-70. Public Act 84-1394 § 6-
208. 1(b) was recently amended. That section now provides that driving privileges "shall
be restored unless the person is otherwise disqualified by this Code." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
95 /2, para. 6-208.1(b) (Supp. 1986). See also infra notes 394, 403-04.
196. Following the precedent set in People v. Reiner, 6 Il. 2d 337, 129 N.E.2d 159
(1955), the court held that the doctrine of separation of powers comes into play only
when one branch exerts a substantial power exclusively belonging to another or when the
exercise of administrative functions detracted from the performance of essentially judicial
activities of the court. O'Donnell, 116 Ill. 2d at 527, 508 N.E.2d at 1071. In O'Donnell,
the court ruled that neither situation was presented. Id. at 528, 508 N.E.2d at 1071.
197. O'Donnell, 116 II1. 2d at 527, 508 N.E.2d at 1071.
198. Id. at 528, 508 N.E.2d at 1071.
199. 114 Ill. 2d 474, 501 N.E.2d 1253 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3235 (1987).
200. Id. at 477, 501 N.E.2d at 1254 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 '2, para. 11-1006
(1985)). The pertinent statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) No person shall stand in a roadway for the purpose of soliciting a ride
from the driver of any vehicle.
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ute unconstitutional and the State appealed.2 °'
Although the State charged the defendant with violating two
provisions of the statute which prohibit the stopping of
automobiles to solicit a ride or business, she challenged a third pro-
vision which permits an exemption for charitable solicitations by
agencies which have met specific conditions, and which have re-
ceived express permission by municipal ordinance.2 °2 The defend-
ant argued that the statute unconstitutionally favored solicitation
for charitable contributions over non-charitable businesses and
that it improperly favored some charities over others.20 a The cir-
cuit court agreed and concluded that the statute resulted in an ar-
bitrary and unreasonable classification.2°
On appeal, the defendant conceded that prohibiting solicitation
was a valid means of keeping the highways safe for travel, and was
legitimately related to the state's duty to provide for the health,
safety, and welfare of highway travelers. 205 Tosch argued, how-
ever, that the statute improperly regulated fundamental first
amendment rights.2° She also argued that the statute created an
unreasonable classification which violated the equal protection
provisions in the Federal Constitution and the equal protection
and special legislation provisions in the Illinois Constitution. 20 7
(b) . . . for the purpose of soliciting employment or business...
(c) ... for the purpose of soliciting contributions ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 /2, para. 11-1006 (1985).
201. Tosch, 114 Ill. 2d at 476, 501 N.E.2d at 1253-54.
202. Id. at 476-77, 501 N.E.2d at 1254. To qualify for an exemption, the agency
soliciting for the contribution must be:
(1) registered with the Attorney General as a charitable organization ....
(2) engaged in a Statewide fund raising activity; and
(3) liable for any injuries to any person or property during the solicitation
which is causally related ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 '/2, para. 11-1006(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) (1985).
203. Tosch, 114 Il. 2d at 478-79, 501 N.E.2d at 1254-55.
204. Id. Although the complaint did not state whether Tosch was charged under
subsection (a) or (b) of the statute, the circuit court held both subsections unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 477-78, 501 N.E.2d at 1254. For text of the statute, see supra note 200.
The court, however, did not specify whether it held the statute invalid because it violated
equal protection guarantees or because it was special legislation, but noted that the stan-
dards for determining validity for either were the same. Tosch, 114 Ill. 2d at 477, 501
N.E.2d at 1254.
205. Id. at 478, 501 N.E.2d at 1254-55.
206. Id. at 480, 501 N.E.2d at 1255. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
207. Tosch, 114 Ill. 2d at 480, 501 N.E.2d at 1255-56. See U.S CONST. amend. XIV;
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. Special legislation confers a special benefit or exclusive privi-
lege on a person or group discriminating in favor of a select person or group. Jenkins, 102
Ill. 2d at 478, 468 N.E.2d at 1167 (citing Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano, 83 111. 2d
130, 137-38, 414 N.E.2d 458, 462 (1980)). The court has applied an equal protection
analysis in reviewing statutes challenged under the Illinois special legislation provision.
19881
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Specifically, Tosch argued that the provision was discriminatory
and non-uniform 208 because municipalities, which must grant per-
mission as a prerequisite to the exemption, operated without statu-
tory guidelines to determine how charities were to be favored.209
Further, the provision permitted a charitable exemption that was
unrelated to any legitimate legislative purpose and created an un-
reasonable classification because the hazard that the statute sought
to eliminate was just as great whether the person was soliciting for
an exempt charity or for a non-charitable business or personal
purpose.21°
The supreme court upheld the statute's validity. 21I The court
first concluded that the statute imposed a valid time, place, and
manner restriction on solicitation and refused to find any funda-
mental first amendment right implicated.2 2 Then, following the
precedent set in Jenkins v. Wu, 213 the court concluded that the
state may treat different classes of people differently and, upon a
rational basis, may differentiate between persons similarly situ-
ated.21 4 Moreover, the court recognized the General Assembly's
judgment that solicitations by charities resulted in benefits to the
Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at 477-78, 468 N.E.2d at 1167 (citing Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d
295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) for providing the reasoning underlying such similar
treatment).
208. Tosch, 114 Il. 2d at 478-79, 501 N.E.2d at 1255. The defendant argued that the
provision requiring the agency to be involved in statewide fund raising was discrimina-
tory and aimed at protecting against fund raising by religious cults such as the Moonies
and Hare Krishna's. Id. at 493-94, 501 N.E.2d at 1255.
209. Id. at 481-82, 501 N.E.2d at 1256. The defendant argued that she had standing
to sue even though she was not a member of the class against whom she claimed the
statute discriminates (a charity) because the subsections of the statute are so interrelated.
The court, however, rejected her contention and held that she failed to raise on appeal the
issue of the statute's validity on discriminatory grounds. Id. at 477, 501 N.E.2d at 1255.
210. Id. at 482, 501 N.E.2d at 1256.
211. Id. at 482-83, 501 N.E.2d at 1257.
212. Id. at 480-81, 501 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
213. 102 11. 2d 468, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984). In Jenkins, the court upheld a statute
which effectively denied medical malpractice plaintiffs access to the records of medical
review committees, but permitted such access to physicians whose staff privileges were
under attack. Id. at 477, 468 N.E.2d at 1166. The court reasoned that the fourteenth
amendment did not deny a state the power to treat different classes of persons differently
and, in the absence of a fundamental right or suspect classification, a legislature may
differentiate between persons similarly situated if there was a rational basis for doing so.
Id. at 477, 468 N.E.2d at 1166-67 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); People
v. Mathey, 99 I1. 2d 292, 458 N.E.2d 499 (1983); People v. Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d 410, 403
N.E.2d 1029 (1980)). The court upheld the statute as an attempt by the legislature to
safeguard physicians' rights to due process and held the exemption constitutional. Jen-
kins, 102 Ill. 2d at 482, 468 N.E.2d at 1169.
214. Tosch, 114 Ill. 2d at 482, 501 N.E.2d at 1256.
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public that offset the inherent risks involved in solicitation. 21' The
court concluded, therefore, that the classification was reasonably
related to legitimate government objectives.216
E. Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings
1. Forgery Warranting Formal Censure
In In re Levy, 1 7 the Chicago Attorney Registration and Discipli-
nary Commission ("ARDC") successfully charged an attorney,
Stephen Levy, with knowingly negotiating a check containing a
false endorsement. 21 8 A review board affirmed the finding and rec-
ommended reprimand.2t 9
Mercedes Hoffman retained Stephen Levy in her dissolution of
marriage action. After her separation, she was injured in an auto-
mobile accident. Mr. Hoffman clearly had no monetary interest in
this suit. Despite clear instructions from Levy to the insurance
company, a settlement check and release were issued in the names
of both Mr. and Mrs. Hoffman and sent to Levy's office. 220 After
witnessing his client's signature on the release, Levy was called out
of the room. On his return, Levy noticed Mr. Hoffman's signature
on both Mrs. Hoffman's release and check. He then endorsed his
client's check, cashed it, and gave Mrs. Hoffman her share, and
returned the release forms to the insurance company. Mr. Hoff-
man discovered his name had been signed and witnessed falsely
and reported Levy to the ARDC.221
Relying on the court's definition of fraud in In re Armentrout,222
215. Id. at 482-83, 501 N.E.2d at 1257.
216. Id. Chief Justice Clark wrote a dissent longer than the opinion. The Chief Jus-
tice concluded that the defendant had standing to sue as a member of an aggrieved class.
Id. at 485-86, 501 N.E.2d at 1258 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). He asserted that the highway
was a public forum which involved fundamental rights protected by the first amendment.
Id. at 491, 501 N.E.2d at 1258 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). He concluded that the defendant
had standing to assert the rights of free speech on behalf of all whose solicitations were
penalized under the statute. Id. at 487, 501 N.E.2d at 1259 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
Having found a fundamental right, Chief Justice Clark agreed that the statnte must be
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest, not merely rationally reiated to a
legitimate legislative purpose. Id. at 487, 501 N.E.2d at 1260 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Clark not only viewed the statute as discriminatory, he also failed to see any
relationship "whatsoever" to the "safety of the means by which funds are gathered." Id.
at 483, 501 N.E.2d at 1257 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
217. 115 Ill. 2d 395, 504 N.E.2d 107 (1987).
218. Id. at 396, 504 N.E.2d at 107.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 397, 504 N.E.2d at 107.
221. Id. at 398, 504 N.E.2d at 107-08.
222. 99 Il. 2d 242, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983). Armentrout involved a State's Attor-
ney's attempt to induce election officials to place a referendum on an election ballot by
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the Administrator claimed that Levy's conduct was fraudulent be-
cause he acted dishonestly, fraudulently, and deceitfully, thereby
violating the bar's fundamental obligation of honesty.223 The Ad-
ministrator sought the attorney's suspension.224
The court distinguished Armentrout and concluded that the facts
clearly indicated that Levy did not have any fraudulent intent to
"cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter, or terminate any
right, obligation, or power with reference to any person or prop-
erty. '225 Unlike the defendant in Armentrout, Levy lacked the es-
sential element of intent to defraud.226 The fact that Mr. Hoffman
had no interest in the settlement was uncontested, and Levy could
not defraud Mr. Hoffman of an interest he did not possess.227
The court also distinguished Levy's case from In re Thebeau.228
Unlike the attorney in Thebeau, Levy did not fail to disclose perti-
nent facts to the court and did not permit his client to obtain
through forgery anything of value belonging to another. Although
Levy's conduct was imprudent, it caused no one harm.229 After
considering several mitigating factors,23 ° the court held that Levy's
misconduct was serious enough to warrant formal censure rather
than reprimand, but not grave enough for suspension.23'
forging petition signatures. Id. at 245, 457 N.E.2d at 1263. The court ruled that fraud
encompasses a broad range of conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresenta-
tion, including any direct or indirect behavior calculated to deceive. Id. at 251, 457
N.E.2d at 1266.
223. Levy, 115 11. 2d at 399, 504 N.E.2d at 108 (citing In re Armentrout, 99 II1. 2d
242, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (quoting In re Lamberis, 93 Il1. 2d 222, 443 N.E.2d 549 (1982))).
224. Levy, 115 Ill. 2d at 397, 504 N.E.2d at 107.
225. Id. at 399, 504 N.E.2d at 108 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 17-
3(b)(1985)).
226. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 17-3 (1985)).
227. Levy, 115 11. 2d at 399, 504 N.E.2d at 108.
228. 1Ill11. 2d 251, 489 N.E.2d 877 (1986). Thebeau involved an attorney who, in
probating an estate, notarized signatures he had not witnessed, misrepresented facts to a
circuit court, knowingly permitted his client to commit forgery, produced no character
witnesses on his behalf, and presented no mitigating factors. Id.
229. Levy, 115 111. 2d at 400, 504 N.E.2d at 108. The court has previously disciplined
lawyers even though their conduct did not harm any specific individual. See In re Ar-
mentrout, 99 III. 2d 242, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983); and In re Lamberis, 93 II1. 2d 222, 443
N.E.2d 549 (1982).
230. In Levy, the court found several factors in mitigation. Levy presented several
character witnesses, and conducted himself candidly throughout his examination. The
court also recognized that the chances of Levy repeating such culpable conduct were very
slim. Levy, 115 111. 2d at 400, 504 N.E.2d at 108-09.
231. Id. at 400-01, 504 N.E.2d at 109. The court concluded that Levy was capable of
acting in the future with integrity as an attorney and that neither the public nor the
profession would be harmed by the continuation of his legal career. Id. at 400, 504
N.E.2d at 109.
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2. Due Process Requirements for Criminal
Contempt Proceedings
In People v. Waldron, 232 the court found an attorney, Michael
M. Melius, guilty of indirect criminal contempt 233 for his failure to
file two briefs in a timely fashion.234 Melius was appointed by a
court to represent certain defendants on appeal. 235 He was granted
an extension of time after being denied leave to withdraw as coun-
sel, but the court denied all further motions for extension.236 Ten
months after appellate briefs were due, the appellate court entered
a rule to show cause.237 In compliance with the order for rule to
show cause, Melius appeared before the court and presented rea-
sons231 for having failed to file the required briefs and represented
that he would file the briefs within the month.239 The court subse-
quently entered an order citing him for indirect criminal
contempt.2 °
Melius appealed, alleging that the court had violated due pro-
cess.24 He argued that the order for rule to show cause served as
insufficient notice of the criminal contempt proceedings against
him.242 Because he had no notice, the defendant alleged that he
appeared at the hearing without counsel and was not sufficiently
prepared to defend himself against the criminal contempt
charge.243 He claimed further that the proceeding itself did not
afford him an opportunity for adequate hearing because he could
not present his case through examination of witnesses or presenta-
tion of evidence. 2 "
232. 114 Ill. 2d 295, 500 N.E.2d 17 (1986).
233. Indirect criminal contempt is defined generally as wilful conduct outside the
court's presence that is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court's administra-
tion of justice or derogate its authority or dignity. Waldron, 114 II1. 2d at 297, 302, 500
N.E.2d at 18, 20. See generally People v. Javaras, 51 Ill. 2d 296, 281 N.E,2d 670 (1972);
People v. Jashunsky, 51 111. 2d 220, 282 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
234. Waldron, 114 Ill. 2d at 297, 500 N.E.2d at 18.
235. Id. at 298, 500 N.E.2d at 18.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The accused advised the court that his office was totally understaffed, that a plan
to use law students for research and assistance had failed, and that he had been unable to
communicate with the defendants despite diligent efforts. Id. at 299, 500 N.E.2d at 19.
239. Id. at 298-99, 500 N.E.2d at 18-19.
240. Id. at 299, 500 N.E.2d at 19.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 299-300, 500 N.E.2d at 19.
244. Id. The State argued that the rule to show cause sufficiently informed Melius )f
the charges against him; that pleadings in indirect criminal contempt actions need not
have all the formalities of a criminal complaint; and that omitting the words "criminal
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The court held that in both direct and indirect criminal con-
tempt proceedings, the accused must be accorded sufficient notice
and a fair hearing.245 Because indirect contempt occurs outside the
presence of the court, an opportunity to present extrinsic evidence
is essential to a fair hearing.246 The court concluded that the rule
to show cause insufficiently notified the defendant of contempt pro-
ceedings because it advised only that the accused should show
cause why the rules and orders of the court had not been obeyed
and not that the accused might be subject to punishment for con-
tempt.247 Furthermore, the court had conducted proceedings in an
informal manner and the accused had not been advised that he
could present evidence.24 Although the court concluded that Me-
lius' conduct failed to meet the standards of the profession, it va-
cated the order of criminal contempt for the appellate court's
failure to comply with the requirement of due process.249
III. LEGISLATION
The Illinois General Assembly actively legislated in the area of
substantive criminal law during the Survey period. The Assembly
expanded the offenses of disorderly conduct, 250 retail theft, 2" and
criminal trespass.25 2 The legislators also amended the residential
burglary statute by expanding the definition of "dwelling. '253
Additionally, the Assembly manifested great concern in the area
of fraud and created offenses relating to odometer254 and home re-
contempt" from the order to show cause did not automatically violate the notice require-
ment. Id. at 300-01, 500 N.E.2d at 20. The State cited authority from the United States
Supreme Court as well as other jurisdictions. Id. Finally, the state claimed that Melius
waived his due process claim by failing to raise the issue at the time of the proceedings.
Id. at 301, 500 N.E.2d at 20.
245. Id. at 302-03, 500 N.E.2d at 21.
246. Id. at 302, 500 N.E.2d at 20.
247. Id. at 303, 500 N.E.2d at 21. The court distinguished the case at issue from
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) and United States v. Joyce
498 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1974), in which respondents were advised that they could be held
in contempt and were required by a rule to show cause to demonstrate why they should
not be so held.
248. Walden, 114 11. 2d at 304, 500 N.E.2d at 21.
249. Id. at 302, 500 N.E.2d at 21.
250. See infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 287, 290-91 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 288, 292-93 and accompanying text.
253. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 2-6 & 19-3 (Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the
amendment to this statute, see Rogers & Wetzel, Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law
Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 435, 461 (1986).
254. See infra notes 297, 299-302 and accompanying text.
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pair fraud,255 as well as public aid wire and public aid mail
fraud.256 Showing concern for general public welfare and safety,
the General Assembly expanded the offense of interfering with
public utility services 257 and created the offense of tampering with
food, drugs, or cosmetics. 258  Recognizing that not-for-profit char-
itable organizations provide Illinois with important and necessary
educational and social services, the Assembly twice amended the
Charitable Games Act in an attempt to provide such organizations
with much needed fund raising activities.25 9
During the Survey year, the legislature exhibited marked con-
cern for children and amended the statutes relating to child abduc-
tion,260 habitual sex offenders,261 indecent solicitation of a child,262
sexual relations within families,263 and child pornography.2M The
legislature also dealt with time limits on prosecution and factors in
aggravation 26 and created the Privacy of Child Victims of Crimi-
nal Sexual Offenses Act. 266
In response to the continuing concern in combating ever-present
drug and alcohol problems, the General Assembly amended the
Cannabis Control Act, 267 the Controlled Substances Act, 268 the
Narcotics and Profit Forfeiture Act, 269 and the Liquor Control
Act.270  Legislators effected procedural changes in the statutory
summary alcohol and other drug related suspension provisions of
255. See infra notes 298, 303-08 and accompanying text.
256. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 17-9 (Supp. 1986). See supra note 19 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of these two newly created offenses, see Rogers & Wetzel,
Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 435, 462 (1986).
257. See infra notes 309, 311-16 and accompanying text.
258. See infra notes 310, 317-18 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 319-29 and accompanying text.
260. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-5 (Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the
amended statute relating to child abduction in relationship to violations of visitation
rights, see Rogers & Wetzel, Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 LoY. U. CHI.
L. J., 435, 459-60 (1986). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-5(b)(1) (Supp. 1987).
261. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 221-230 (Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the
amendment and the creation of the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act, see
Rogers & Wetzel, Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 435,
460 (1986).
262. See infra notes 332, 336-39 and accompanying text.
263. See infra notes 333, 340-44 and accompanying text.
264. See infra notes 334, 345-52 and accompanying text.
265. See infra notes 353-62 and accompanying text.
266. See infra notes 335, 363-66 and accompanying text.
267. See infra notes 367-78 and accompanying text.
268. See infra notes 379-82 and accompanying text.
269. See infra notes 384-87 and accompanying text.
270. See infra notes 388-89 and accompanying text.
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the DUI statute,27 repealed certain chemical testing,27 2 and ef-
fected several perfunctory changes in the DUI procedure and judi-
cial driving permit provisions.273
Finally, the General Assembly repealed the feticide law, replac-
ing it with a new statute relating to crimes to unborn children,274
enacted major revisions in the homicide statute,275 created a new
offense to guard against civil disorder,276 and passed a new Domes-
tic Violence Act.277
A. Disorderly Conduct
The General Assembly passed two Public Acts regarding the
criminal offense of disorderly conduct 278 relating to the transmis-
sion of false reports of abuse or requests for emergency assistance.
Public Act 84-1322, now codified and effective September 4, 1986,
specifically related to nursing care facilities and amended the sen-
tence to be imposed for disorderly conduct. 279 A person who
knowingly transmits a false report to the Department of Public
Health under the Nursing Home Care Reform Act of 1979280 com-
mits disorderly conduct punishable as a Class B misdemeanor. 28'
Public Act 84-1232, now codified and effective January 1, 1987,
punishes false reports of victims of violence and abuse and provides
that a person who knowingly transmits false requests for police,
fire, paramedic, or ambulance assistance, or who transmits requests
without a reasonable belief of need, commits disorderly conduct 2 2
punishable as a Class A misdemeanor.283 A person who transmits
false reports concerning victims of violence and abuse 284 now com-
271. See infra notes 390-93, 405-07 and accompanying text.
272. See infra note 408 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 394-404 and accompanying text.
274. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2, 12-3.1, 12-4.4 (Supp. 1987).
For a discussion of the repeal and newly enacted statute see Rogers & Wetzel, Criminal
Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 435, 457-59 (1986).
275. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 2-8, 9-1, 9-2 (Supp. 1987). For a discussion of
major revisions relating to murder and voluntary manslaughter, see Rogers & Wetzel,
Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 435, 455-56 (1986).
276. See infra notes 417-20 and accompanying text.
277. See infra notes 409-16 and accompanying text.
278. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 26-1 (Supp. 1987).
279. Id. at para. 26-1(a)(8) and 26-1(b).
280. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 '/2, para. 415 1-101 et seq. (Supp. 1987).
281. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 26-1(b)(Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
para. 4153-702 (Supp. 1987).
282. Id. at para. 26-1(a)(9).
283. Id. at para. 26-1(b).
284. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6501 et seq. (Supp. 1987). Public Act 84-1232
grants civil immunity to any person who makes a good faith report of the abuse of an
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mits disorderly conduct 285 punishable as a Class B misdemeanor.286
B. Retail Theft, Criminal Trespass, and Victim's Rights
Public Act 84-1391, now codified and effective September 18,
1986, effected several changes in the offenses of retail theft287 and
criminal trespass 28 and amended the rights of crime victims. 289
The act expands the offense of retail theft and provides that the
amendment takes effect upon the act becoming law. 290 A person
commits retail theft when he knowingly and falsely represents to a
merchant that he is the owner of merchandise that he is returning
or attempting to return in exchange for money, credit or other
property.291
The General Assembly expanded the offense of criminal trespass
to land to include criminal trespass to real property.2 92 Any person
who either enters or remains upon the land or a non-residential
building of another after receiving notice to depart commits the
Class C misdemeanor of criminal trespass.293
The act also added a new right to the list of Rights of Victims. 294
A crime victim may now hire an attorney, at his own expense, in
order to receive copies of all notices, motions, and court orders
filed in the case as if he were a party to the suit.295
C. Fraud
The General Assembly created several new offenses regarding
fraud relating to public state aid,296 automobile tampering,297 and
elderly individual, but punishes a knowingly false report of such abuse as disorderly con-
duct. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 6504, 6504.1 (Supp. 1987).
285. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 26-1(a)(10) (Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23,
para. 6504 (Supp. 1987).
286. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 26-1(b) (Supp. 1987).
287. Id. at para. 16A-3.
288. Id. at para. 21-3.
289. Id. at para. 1404.
290. Id. at para. 16A-3.
291. Id. at para. 16A-3(f).
292. Id. at para. 21-3(a).
293. Id.
294. Id. at para. 1404.
295. Id. at para. 1404(19).
296. The General Assembly created two offenses in an attempt to prevent a person
from unlawfully obtaining state public aid payments. Public Act 84-1255 created Public
Aid Wire Fraud. Id. at para. 17-9. Public Act 84-1256 created Public Aid Mail Fraud.
Id. at para. 17-9. Both acts became effective January 1, 1987. For a discussion of this
statute see Rogers & Wetzel, Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 435, 462 (1986).
297. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 17-11 (Supp. 1987).
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home repair. 291 Public Act 84-1391, now codified and effective
September 18, 1986, created the offense of odometer fraud.299 Any
person who intentionally defrauds another by disconnecting, reset-
ting, or altering the odometer of any used motor vehicle commits
the Class A misdemeanor of odometer fraud a.3 1 The statute pun-
ishes a second or subsequent violation as a Class 4 felony.30,' The
offense does not apply to legitimate automotive parts recyclers who
recycle used odometers for resale in legitimate business.30 2
Public Act 84-1270, now codified and effective August 11, 1986,
provided for the new offense of home repair fraud.30 3 A person
commits home repair fraud when he knowingly enters into an
agreement or contract in which he misrepresents a material fact,
uses a false promise or deception to induce a contract, makes an
unconscionable agreement, or fails to comply with the provisions
of the assumed name act.304 A person is liable also when he know-
ingly damages property with the intent to enter into an agreement
for repair or knowingly misrepresents himself as an employee of a
governmental agency or public utility to induce such an agree-
ment.305 The offense is aggravated when a person perpetrates the
fraud against a person sixty years of age or older.30 6 The statute
classifies home repair fraud as either a Class A misdemeanor or a
Class 3 or 4 felony;307 and classifies aggravated home repair fraud
as either a Class 2, Class 3, or Class 4 felony.30 8
D. Unlawful Interference and Tampering
The General Assembly dealt with the offenses of interfering with
public services 3° 9 and tampering with public safety310 by passing
two recently codified Public Acts. Public Act 84-1444, effective
July 1, 1987, expanded the offense of unlawful interference with
298. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 1601-05 (Supp. 1987).
299. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 17-11 (Supp. 1987).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 '/2, para. 1601-05 (Supp. 1987).
304. Id. at para. 1603(a)(1)-(4).
305. Id. at para. 1603(b)(1)-(2).
306. Id. at para. 1605. The defendant's reasonable belief that the victim was under
sixty years of age is no defense. Id.
307. Id. at para. 1604(a)-(d).
308. Id. at paras. 1605(a)-(c). The classification depends upon the amount of the
contract and the statute permits an aggregation of amounts. Id.
309. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-14 (Supp. 1987).
310. Id. at para. 12-4.5.
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public utility services. 31 ' The statute creates a rebuttable presump-
tion that an individual has committed unlawful interference with a
public utility service in two situations.3'2 First, the presumption
will exist when any instrument, apparatus, or device is used to ob-
tain utility services without full payment.3' 3 Second, the presump-
tion will exist when any meter has been altered, tampered with, or
bypassed, thereby causing inaccurate measurement of service on
premises controlled by a customer or a direct beneficiary of the
utility service.314 The statute punishes conviction as a Class A mis-
demeanor;315 any subsequent conviction is punished as a Class 4
felony.316
Public Act 84-1428, codified and effective July 1, 1987, created
the new offense of tampering with food, drugs, or cosmetics. 31 7
Any person who knowingly adds any substance into any food,
drug, or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption capable of caus-
ing death or great bodily injury commits a Class 2 felony of
tampering.1
E. Gambling
The General Assembly twice amended the offense of gambling
during the Survey year. Public Act 84-1303, now codified and ef-
fective on September 1, 1986, enacted the Charitable Games Act
permitting Las Vegas Night types of fund-raising games for non-
profit organizations. 319 These games are exempt from prosecution
under the gambling statute. 20 Charitable, religious, and educa-
tional organizations and institutions organized and conducted on a
non-profit basis that are exempt from federal income taxation qual-
ify for the right to engage in charitable games.32' A qualified or-
ganization receives the right to conduct charitable games upon the
payment of a two hundred dollar fee subject to certain licensing
311. Id. at para. 16-14. A person unlawfully interferes with a public utility service
when he knowingly, and without consent, impairs, interrupts or diverts any public water,
gas or power supply, or other public service. Id. at para. 16-14(a).
312. Id. at para. 16-14(c).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at para. 16-14(d)(1). If the offense was committed for remuneration, the
individual is charged with a Class 4 felony. Id.
316. Id. at para. 16-14(d)(2).
317. Id. at para. 12-4.5.
318. Id. at para. 12-14.5(a),(b).
319. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 1121-1135 (Supp. 1987).
320. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 28-1(b)(9) (Supp. 1987).
321. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 1122 (Supp. 1987).
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requirements.3 22 The conduct of the games is also subject to cer-
tain restrictions.323 The act prohibits any person who has been
convicted of a violation of Article 28 of the Criminal Code of 1961
from entering the licensed premises.324 Any person who conducts
or knowingly participates in an unlicensed game commits the of-
fense of gambling.325 Violation of the statute constitutes a Class A
misdemeanor, and any subsequent offense constitutes a Class 4
felony.326
Public Act 84-1407, now codified and made effective upon be-
coming law, further amends the gambling statute.327 The statute
now permits the drafting, printing, or publishing of lottery or pol-
icy tickets if authorized and conducted pursuant to the laws of Illi-
nois or any other state or foreign government. 32  The statute also
adds a new provision permitting the advertisement of lotteries and
policy games as long as the activity is related to a lottery, bingo
game, or raffle authorized by and conducted pursuant to the laws
of Illinois or any other state.329
F. Children, Abduction, and Sexual Offenses
The General Assembly exhibited marked concern for child ab-
duction,33 I habitual child sex offenders, 3 ' indecent solicitation of a
322. Id. at para. 1123. An Illinois person, firm, or corporation may provide the
premises for the charitable games only after receiving a provider's license upon written
application and payment of an annual fifty dollar fee, but cannot provide the same prem-
ises for more than four days per year. Id. at para. 1125. The provider may receive com-
pensation, but it may not be based upon any percentage of the gross receipts. Id. A
qualified organization conducting games on its own premises is exempt. Id. An Illinois
person, firm, or corporation may sell, lease, lend or distribute supplies, devices and other
games-equipment only after receiving a supplier's license upon written application and
payment of an annual five hundred dollar fee. Id. at para. 1126. A qualified charitable
organization can own its own equipment, but must be similarly licensed upon written
application and payment of a fifty dollar fee. Id. Provider's and supplier's licenses are
valid for one year. Id. Certain persons are ineligible for any license under the act. Id. at
para. 1127.
323. Id. at para. 1128.
324. Id. at para. 1130.
325. Id. at para. 1132.
326. Id.
327. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 28-1 (Supp. 1987)(effective September 19, 1986).
328. Id. at para. 28-1(a)(9). The prior statute restricted the drafting, printing, and
publishing of Illinois Lottery tickets or policy games only if authorized by the Illinois
statutes.
329. Id. at para. 28-1(a)(10).
330. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-5 (Supp. 1986). For a discussion of the amend-
ment, effective August 15, 1986, which relates to child abduction and visitation viola-
tions, see Rogers & Wetzel, Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 435, 459 (1986).
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child,332 sexual relations within families,333 child pornography,334
and the privacy of a child sexual offense victim. 335
Public Act 84-1280, now codified and effective August 15, 1986,
amended the statute relating to the indecent solicitation of a
child.336 The act increases the penalties for the offense of indecent
solicitation under certain circumstances.337 An act which would
have been criminal sexual abuse becomes a Class A misde-
meanor. 338 An act that would have constituted criminal sexual as-
sault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or aggravated criminal
sexual abuse becomes a Class 4 felony.339
Public Act 84-1280 also amended the statute relating to sexual
relations within families.3 4  The act provides that an individual
commits the Class 3 felony of sexual relations within families 34 '
when the person commits sexual penetration 342 and knows that he
or she is related to the other person as brother or sister, of whole
blood, of half blood,343 or as father or mother, when the child is of
whole blood, half blood, or adopted, regardless of legitimacy, or as
stepfather or stepmother when the stepchild was eighteen years of
age or over when the act was committed. 3 "
Public Act 84-1280 provided for the additional sanction of for-
feiture upon committing the offense of child pornography.345 A
person who commits child pornography must now forfeit any prof-
its or proceeds and any interest or property acquired or maintained
331. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 221-230 (Supp. 1986). For a discussion of this
new act, effective July 1, 1986, requiring the registration of habitual child sex offenders
and confidentiality of information concerning minor victims, see Rogers & Wetzel, Crimi-
nal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 435, 462 (1986).
332. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-6 (Supp. 1987).
333. Id. at para. 11-11.
334. Id. at para. 11-20.1.
335. Id. at paras. 1451-53.
336. Id. at para. 11-6(2).
337. Id. at para. 11-6(c)(1)(2).
338. Id. at para. 11-6(c)(1).
339. Id. at para. (6)(c)(2).
340. Id. at para. 11-11.
341. Id. at para. 11-1l(b).
342. Id. at para. ll-ll(a)(1). The act of sexual penetration is defined in ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-12 (Supp. 1987).
343. Id. at para. II- ll(a)(2)(i).
344. Id. at para. 11.1 l(a)(2)(ii)-(iii). The amendment simply rewrote former subdivi-
sion 11-1 l(a)(2)(ii) as subdivisions 11-1 l(a)(2)(ii) and (iii). The former subdivision pro-
vided in relevant part as follow: "Father or mother, when the child or stepchild,
regardless of legitimacy and either of the whole blood or half-blood or by adoption, was
eighteen years of age or over when the act was committed." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 11-1 l(a)(2)(ii) (1985).
345. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20.1 (Supp. 1987).
19881
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 19
as a result of the offense.346 In addition, the offender forfeits any
interest, security, claim, and property or contractual right of any
kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise he estab-
lished, operated, conducted, or controlled in relation to child por-
nography. 347 The Attorney General or State's Attorney may
commence forfeiture upon conviction 348 and may petition the court
following sentencing for a forfeiture hearing proving its case for
forfeiture by a preponderance of evidence standard.3 49 The Act au-
thorizes the Attorney General to seize and sell all forfeited prop-
erty and other interests.350
The act further creates a business offense in relation to child por-
nography. 31  A commercial film or photographic print processor
who, within the scope of his professional capacity, has knowledge
of, or observes and fails to report, any sexual act or simulation
involving a person whom he knows, or should reasonably know, to
be under the age of eighteen years commits a business offense and
is subject to a one thousand dollar fine. 52
346. Id. at para. 1l-20.1(f)(l)(A).
347. Id. at para. 1l-20.1(f)(1)(B).
348. Id. at para. 11-20.1(f)(2)(C).
349. Id. at para. 1l-20.1(f)(2)(A). The circuit court may also conduct a non-jury
forfeiture hearing upon the People's petition for any restraining order, injunction, or pro-
hibition in connection with any property or interest subject to forfeiture. Id. at para. 1 -
20.1(f)(2)(B). The People must establish that there is probable cause, that the person
charged with the offense did, indeed, commit child pornography, and that there is prob-
able cause that the property or interest involved is, indeed, subject to forfeiture. Id. The
hearing may be conducted simultaneously with a preliminary hearing, or upon the Peo-
ple's motion, at any stage of the proceedings. Id. The probable cause standard may be
met by the filing of an information charging the offense or by the return of a grand jury
indictment. Id.
350. Id. at para. 11-20.1(f)(2)(C), (D). Following a deduction for the expenses of
administration and sale, id., the Attorney General distributes the proceeds equally to the
unit or units of government whose personnel conducted the investigation into child por-
nography and effected the arrest and prosecution leading to the forfeiture. Id. at para.
11-20.1 (f)(3).
351. Id. at para. 11-20.2.
352. Id. at para. 11-20.2(vi). An individual is subject to the statute when the sexual
act is depicted on any film, photograph, videotape, negative or slide, id. at para. 11-20.2,
and depicts the child actually or by simulation engaged in any act of:
(i) ... sexual intercourse with any person or animal; or
(ii) . . . sexual contact involving the sex organs of the child and the mouth,
anus, or sex organs of another person or animal or [vice-versa], or
(iii) . .. masturbation; or
(iv) . . . lewd fondling, touching, or caressing involving another person or
animal; or
(v) ... excretion or urination within a sexual context; or
(vi) ... [being] portrayed or depicted as bound, fettered, or subject to sadistic,
masochistic, or sadomasochistic abuse in any sexual context....
Id. at para. l l-20.2(i)-(vi).
Criminal Law
Public Act 84-1280 enacted two important amendments relating
to the time limitation for prosecution3 53 and aggravating factors in
sentencing.354 Public Act 84-1428, now codified and effective July
1, 1987, also added a paragraph expanding upon the permissible
factors for consideration in extended term sentencing.3 5
Added to the offenses receiving extended limitations within
which a prosecution must be commenced are the offenses of inde-
cent solicitation of a child, soliciting for a juvenile prostitute, juve-
nile pimping, and child exploitation. 36 The statutes of limitations
for these offenses do not run until one year after the child reaches
eighteen years of age and the time for prosecution cannot expire
less than three years after the commission of the offense.357 The
limit is similarly expanded for the prosecution of criminal sexual
assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse,
and aggravated criminal sexual abuse when committed against a
victim under eighteen years of age.358
The act also expanded factors in aggravation that may be consid-
ered in sentencing an individual for a criminal sexual offense. 3 9 A
court may now consider the fact that the defendant held a position
of trust with a victim who is under eighteen years of age as an
aggravating factor subjecting the defendant to a more sever sen-
tence under section 1005-8-1. 360 Public Act 84-1428 added yet an-
other aggravating factor for consideration in sentencing. 361 A
court may now impose an extended term sentence under section 5-
8-2 upon an offender who was at least seventeen years of age at the
time of the crime, and who is convicted of aggravated criminal sex-
ual assault upon a victim who was under eighteen years of age.362
With the approval of Public Act 1428, the General Assembly
created the Privacy of Child Victims of Criminal Sexual Offenses
Act.363 The act defines a child as any person under eighteen years
353. Id. at para. 3-6.
354. Id. at para. 1005-5-3.2.
355. Id.
356. Id. at para. 3-6(d.). Child pornography was already among the list of offenses
meriting extended limitations for prosecution. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 3-6(c)(1985).
357. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-6(d) (Supp. 1987).
358. Id.
359. Id. at para. 1005-5-3.2(a)(12).
360. Id. The position of trust or supervision includes, but is not limited to, teacher,
scout leader, baby sitter, or day care worker. Id. To be considered an aggravating factor,
the defendant must have violated section 11-6, 11-11, 11-15.1, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 11-20.1,
12-13, 12-14, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961. Id.
361. Id. at para. 1005-5-3.2.
362. Id. at para. 1005-5-3.2(c).
363. Id. at paras. 1451-53.
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of age 3  and protects the confidentiality of law enforcement and
court records.365 The inspection and copying of law enforcement
records relating to any investigation or proceeding relating to a
criminal sexual offense is restricted to exclude the child victim's
identity. a66
G. Cannabis Control, Controlled Substances,
Narcotics, and Forfeiture
The General Assembly responded to the continuing problem of
cannabis control by twice amending the Cannabis Control Act.367
Public Act 82-1233, now codified and effective January 1, 1987,
rewrote a paragraph of the act.3 68 A person who knowingly pro-
duces or possesses the cannabis sativa plant now violates the Can-
nabis Control Act. 369  The statute punishes the unlawful
production or the unauthorized possession of under five cannabis
sativa plants as a Class A misdemeanor. 370 A person who produces
or possesses more than five, but less than twenty plants is guilty of
a Class 4 felony.37' A person who produces or possesses more than
twenty, but less than fifty plants, is guilty of a Class 3 felony. 72 A
person who produces or possesses more than fifty plants is guilty of
a Class 2 felony, is fined up to $100,000, and is subject to the costs
of the investigation and eradication of the plants.37 3 A person who
engages in a calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy 3 74 after one or
364. Id. at para. 1452.
365. Id. at para. 1453.
366. Id. The provision does not generally affect access to such records by a judge,
state's attorney, assistant state's attorney, psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, doc-
tor, parent, defendant or defendant's attorney. Id. The court, however, may prohibit any
person or agency present at court proceedings to further disclose the child victim's iden-
tity for the child's protection and upon a showing of good cause after notice and hearing
to all affected parties. Id. In making its decision, the court will consider both the best
interests of the child and the existence of any compelling state interests. Id. at para. 1453
(a)-(b).
367. ILL. REV. STAT. 56 I/2, paras. 708-09, 715.1, 716.1 (Supp. 1987).
368. Id. at para. 708.
369. Id.
370. Id. at para. 708(a).
371. Id. at para. 708(b).
372. Id. at para. 708(c).
373. Id. at para. 708(d). The forfeited money is collected as compensation for the
expenses of enforcement which is made available to the law enforcement agency that
conducted the investigation or contributed to the prosecution. Id. Receipts are to be
used in enforcing laws regulating controlled substances and cannabis. Id. Proceeds
awarded to the state treasury are deposited in a special Drug Traffic Prevention Fund.
Id.
374. A person engages in calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy when he possesses
or produces more than twenty cannabis sativa plants with two or more persons and ob-
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more convictions for the production or possession of more than
fifty plants will be guilty of a Class 1 felony.375
Public Act 84-1362, now codified and effective September 10,
1986, added two paragraphs to the Cannabis Control Act.376 Sec-
tion 15.1 provides that any cannabis derivative that is designated,
rescheduled, or deleted as a controlled substance under federal law
may be controlled in accordance with the Illinois Controlled Sub-
stance Act.377 Section 16.1 creates an affirmative defense for prose-
cution under the Cannabis Control Act that the substance
possessed was regulated as a controlled substance under the act.378
The General Assembly also twice amended the Controlled Sub-
stances Act.379 Public Act 84-1314, now codified and effective Jan-
uary 1, 1987, expanded the nature of prohibited substances by
including analogs among the prohibited substances.38 0 An analog
is now treated in the same manner as the controlled substance to
which it is similar.381
Public Act 84-1475, now codified and effective February 5, 1987,
added a new paragraph providing that any person eighteen years
or older who violates the act by using, engaging, or employing a
person under eighteen years of age to deliver a controlled, counter-
feit, or look-alike substance could be sentenced for a term up to
twice the maximum authorized amount found in the pertinent
sections.38 2
tains anything of value greater than five hundred dollars from the act, or when he or-
ganizes, directs, or finances the violation or conspiracy. Id. at para. 709(b)(1)-(3).
375. Id. at para. 709(a)(1).
376. Id. at paras. 715.1, 716.1.
377. Id. at para. 715.1(a)-(c). The newly-added section also provides procedures for
written objections to the designation or deletion of a controlled substance and for the
hearing of such objections. Id.
378. Id. at para. 716.1. The defendant must give the State notice of his affirmative
defense not less than seven days prior to trial. Id.
379. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 'A, para. 1401 (Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
paras. 1003-3-2, 1003-8-2, 1005-5-3 (Supp. 1987).
380. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 'A, para. 1401 (Supp. 1987). Controlled substance ana-
logs are substances intended for human consumption that are substantially similar in
chemical structure to controlled substances and specifically designed to produce an effect
substantially similar to the controlled substance. Id. The chemical classes in which con-
trolled substance analogs may be found include phenethylamines, N-substituted piperi-
dines, morphinans, ecgonines, quinazolinones, substituted indoles, ano arylcycloal-
kylamines. Id.
381. Id. at para. 1401(a)(l)-(1 1), (c),(d). The act exempts the manufacture, posses-
sion or distribution of a substance complying with the provisions of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act relating to new drug applications or investigational uses. Id. at
para. 1401.
382. Id. at para. 1407.1. The defendant must have violated sections 401, 404, or 405
of the act. Id.
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Public Act 84-1428 altered the method of trial in criminal cases.
The state now essentially possesses the right to a jury trial in crimi-
nal prosecutions.183
Public Act 84-1428 also amended the Narcotics Profit Forfeiture
Act.38 4 The amendment creates a rebuttable presumption on the
state's behalf, that any property or property interest of a person
convicted of narcotics racketeering is subject to forfeiture.38 5 To
initiate the presumption, the state must first establish by a prepon-
derance of evidence that the defendant acquired the property or
interest during the period or within a reasonable time after the vio-
lation 386 and that there was no likely alternative source for such
property or interest. 87
H. Liquor Control and Driving Under the Influence
The General Assembly created a Class C misdemeanor by
amending the Liquor Control Act through its passage of Public
Act 84-1379. a8 As of January 1, 1987, a person who rents a hotel
or motel room either for the purpose or with the knowledge that
persons under twenty-one years will use it for the consumption of
alcohol commits a Class C misdemeanor. 389
The General Assembly passed two public acts dealing with driv-
ing while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.390 The Secretary
of State must revoke the license of a driver who is under the age of
twenty-one if convicted of driving while under the influence in vio-
383. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-1 (1987). All prosecutions except those in
which the defendant pleads guilty or guilty but mentally ill shall be tried by a judge and
jury unless the defendant, in writing, waives his right to jury trial. Id. In criminal prose-
cutions in which any charges are felony violations of the Cannabis Control Act or Illinois
Controlled Substances Act both the State and the defendant must, in writing, waive the
right to trial by jury. Id.
384. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 /2, para. 1655 (Supp. 1987).
385. Id. at para. 1655(b).
386. Id. at para. 1655(b)(1).
387. Id. at para. 1655(b)(2).
388. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 131 (1987).
389. Id. at para. 131(d). As of September 12, 1986, any person twenty-one years or
older who pays for a hotel or motel room or other facility knowing the room will be used
by persons under twenty-one years for unlawful alcoholic consumption will be liable to
any person injured, in person or property, as a result of the intoxication of the youths
involved. Id. at para. 135(a). The Liquor Control Act was also amended to extend liabil-
ity for an Illinois dram shop cause of action to persons who sell liquor outside the State of
Illinois. Id. at para. 135(a). Any person licensed under any law to sell liquor submits
himself to the Illinois jurisdiction if he causes the intoxication of a person, by sale or by
gift, who caused injury to another while intoxicated. Id. at para. 135(b).
390. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, paras. 6-205, 6-206, 6-206.1 6-208, 6-208.1, 6-303,
11-501.1 (Supp. 1987).
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lation of section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.39' After one
year, upon application, the Secretary of State has the discretion to
issue a restricted driving permit.3 92 Following this one-year period,
the Secretary may issue a license, at his discretion and upon writ-
ten application, or may extend a revocable restricted driving
permit.393
Public Act 84-1394, now codified and effective September 18,
1986, made several changes to the DUI procedure and judicial
driving permit provisions.394 The statute expands the circum-
stances for issuing a restricted driving permit.395 Upon conviction
of a traffic offense meriting license revocation,396 the Secretary of
State may, at his discretion, issue the offender a restricted driving
permit granting the privilege to operate a motor vehicle within the
scope of his employment. The Secretary of State may also allow
transportation for the petitioner or household member, to receive
necessary medical care, or for alcohol remedial or rehabilitative
activity.397
The General Assembly also made several changes affecting the
provisions for granting a Judicial Driving Permit ("JDP"). 398 In
391. Id. at para. 6-205(d).
392. Id. Before issuing the permit, the Secretary must be satisfied that the driver will
not endanger the public safety or welfare. Id. The restriction may pertain to driving
limited to the hours of 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. or as otherwise provided. Id.
393. Id. The Secretary of State may extend the restricted driving permit at his discre-
tion, in twelve month segments, as many times as he deems appropriate until the driver
reaches twenty-one years of age. Id. The restricted driving permit is subject to cancella-
tion, revocation and suspension in the same manner as a driver's license. Id. The secre-
tary will revoke all driving privileges if the driver is convicted of a second or subsequent
traffic offense prior to reaching twenty-one years of age. Such an offender cannot apply
either for full reinstatement of driving privileges or for a restricted driving permit until he
reaches twenty-one or until one year from the date of his latest conviction, whichever is
longer. Id.
394. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, paras. 6-205, 6-206, 6-206.1, 6-208.1, 6-303, 11-
501.1 (Supp. 1987).
395. Id. at para. 6-205(c) (Supp. 1987).
396. Id. at para. 11-501 (Supp. 1987) (relating to operating or being in physical con-
trol of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, other drugs, or combination
thereof).
397. Id. at para. 6-205(c) (Supp. 1987). The petitioner must, however, demonstrate
the absence of any other reasonably alternative means of transportation and that he will
not endanger the public safety or welfare. Id. The prior statute granted a restricted
driving permit for the petitioner's use in operating a vehicle from his home to his place of
employment or within "other proper limits," but made no specific provision for operating
a vehicle to satisfy the duties of one's employment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6-
205(c) (1985).
398. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 I/2, para. 6-206.1 (1985). In cases of hardship, limited
driving privileges are granted under specific circumstances to petitioners whose licenses
have been summarily suspended. The court will consider several factors prior to issuing a
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its Declaration of Policy regarding judicial driving permits, the
General Assembly recently recognized the need to provide for lim-
ited driving privileges during the period of suspension, by issuing a
JDP to allow the offender to continue his employment and to per-
mit other necessary activities related to drug treatment or medical
care.a31 If the Secretary of State suspends or revokes the driving
privilege pursuant to the Vehicle Code while the JDP is in effect or
pending, he shall, upon notice to the person and ordering court,
withdraw all driving privileges including the JDP.4° The court
may consider cancellation of the JDP if the petitioner is cited for a
traffic related offense, including operating a vehicle outside the
JDP limitation, violating section 6-303, or if he is convicted of any
offense during the term of the JDP. 1' The court of venue must
forward the JDP to the issuing court if the petitioner commits an
offense defined in section 11-501, or similar local ordinance which
can be evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket." 2
Legislative enactment also effected changes in the statute relat-
ing to the period of statutory summary suspension.?° Following a
statutory suspension, a person will be restored to his full driving
privileges unless he is otherwise disqualified by the Code or the
court has reason to believe the person's driving privilege should not
be restored. 4
JDP. For a list of these factors see Rogers & Wetzel, Criminal Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law
Survey, 18 Loy. U. Cmi. L.J. 435, 457, note 212 (1986). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 '/2, para.
206.1(A)(B) (Supp. 1987). Paragraph 206.1(A) was effective from the date of the act,
September 18, 1986, until January 1, 1987. Paragraph 206.1(B) became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 1987. These two sections are nearly identical. The most significant change deals
with the issuance of the JDP document. Prior to January 1, 1987, the Secretary of State
designed and furnished the courts with an official JDP form which the clerk of the court
issued upon direction of the court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 206. 1(A)(d)(1985).
As of January 1, 1987, the Secretary of State designs and furnishes the court with an
official court order form and the court is permitted to issue an order directing the Secre-
tary of State to issue the JDP. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 '/2, para. 206. l(B)(a) and (d)
(Supp. 1987).
399. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 95 '/2, paras. 206.1(A), 206. 1(A)(c) (Supp. 1986); Id. at paras.
206.1(B), 206.1(B)(c) (Supp. 1987). Again, the permit is granted within the bounds of
public safety and only when the offender has no reasonably alternative means of transpor-
tation. Id. at para. 206.1(A) (Supp. 1986); Id. at para. 206.1(B) (Supp. 1986). The JDP
shall be limited and shall specify the days of the week and the specific hours during which
the petitioner may operate a motor vehicle. Id. at para. 206. 1(A)(c) (Supp. 1986); Id. at
para. 206.1(b)(c) (Supp. 1987).
400. Id. at para. 206.1(A)(a)(3)(iii) (Supp. 1986); Id. at para. 206.1(B)(a)(3)(iii)
(Supp. 1987).
401. Id. at para. 206.1(A)(c) (Supp. 1986); Id. at para. 206.1(B)(c) (Supp. 1987).
402. Id.
403. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 '/2, para. 6-208.1 (Supp. 1986).
404. Id. at para. 6-208.1(b). For text of prior statute and an unsuccessful constitu-
1988] Criminal Law
During the Survey period, the General Assembly made one pro-
cedural change to the statutory summary alcohol or other drug
related suspension provisions." Effective January 1, 1987, when-
ever a person is arrested for any violation of section 11-501 or a
similar provision of a local ordinance, the Secretary of State, upon
receipt of the law enforcement officer's sworn report, 406 shall con-
firm the statutory suspension by mailing a notice of the effective
date of the suspension to the person and the court of venue.407
Lastly, the General Assembly repealed section 11-501.3 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code relating to the chemical testing of a driver
involved in a motor vehicle accident involving personal injury or
death.4°
L Domestic Violence and Civil Disorder
The Illinois General Assembly created the Domestic Violence
Act of 1986 by its passage of Public Act 84-1305, now codified and
effective August 21, 1986.4 9 The act amended the section relating
to child abduction.4 0 A person now commits the crime of child
abduction if he either intentionally violates the terms of any court
tional challenge to it see People v. 0' Donnell, 116 Il1. 2d 517, 508 N.E.2d 1066 (1987);
supra note 183 and accompanying text.
405. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1 (Supp. 1987).
406. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2 para. 11-501.1(d) (1985). In a recent decision, the
Illinois Supreme Court struck down a claim that the sworn statements which police send
to the circuit courts and the Secretary of State were not really "sworn" because they were
not offered before individuals licensed to administer oaths and could thus avoid summary
suspension. The court found the fact that police officers "solemnly, sincerely, and truly"
declare the truth of their reports sufficient to satisfy the statute's intent and sustain sum-
mary suspension. The court further declared its opinion that the summary suspension
provisions should be construed liberally to accomplish the legislature's purpose of foster-
ing highway safety. A defendant may insist that an unsworn report be corrected, but
cannot escape responsibility for drunk driving by a technical deficiency. See People v.
Badoud, et at, No. 65485, slip op. at 2, 6-7 (March 23, 1988).
407. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 I/2 at para. 11-501.1(i) (Supp. 1987). Confirmation of
the statutory summary suspension will not be mailed to the person or entered on the
record, if the sworn report is found to be defective. Id. A report will be defective if it
contains insufficient information or has been completed in error. In such a case, the
sworn report is then forwarded to the court of venue with a copy returned to the issuing
agency identifying the defect. Id.
408. Id. at para. 11-501.3.
409. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2311-2313 (Supp. 1987). The act effected several
changes and additions to the Code of Criminal Law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 10-5,
12-30 (Supp. 1987) and accomplished substantial amendments and additions to section
109-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the new sections are codified as ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, paras. 112A-I through 112A-25 (Supp. 1987)).
410. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-5 (Supp. 1987).
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order granting the child's care or possession to another,41' or if he
intentionally conceals or removes the child from a parent after fil-
ing a petition in an action affecting marriage or paternity prior to
the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody.41 2
By passing this act, the Assembly also created the offense of Viola-
tion of an Order of Protection.41 3 A person commits this Class A
misdemeanor when he either commits an act prohibited by a court
or fails to perform an act in compliance with a court order of pro-
tection. 41 4 The court may either increase the offender's penalty
41 5
or may impose a minimum penalty of twenty-four hours imprison-
ment and may additionally order the defendant to pay a fine or
416make restitution.
Public Act 84-1392, now codified and effective January 1, 1987,
created a new offense relating to the training or demonstration in
the use, application, or making of firearms, explosives or incendi-
ary devices.437 The Assembly makes it unlawful for any person to
teach or demonstrate the use, application, or making of any firearm
explosive, incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury
or death to persons who are known or should have been known to
unlawfully employ such training for the purpose of civil disor-
der.418 The act further prohibits the assembly of two or more per-
sons for the purpose of training or practicing in the use of firearms,
explosives, incendiary devices, or techniques capable of such harm
411. Id. The prior statute limited the offense to intentionally violating a court order
that granted actual custody of the child. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-5(b)(l) (1985).
412. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-5(b)(5) (Supp. 1987). The prior statute pro-
vided for the offense only if the child was concealed or removed after the actual service of
process in an action affecting marriage or paternity. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-
5(b)(5) (1985).
413. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-30 (Supp. 1987).
414. Id. at para. 12-30(a)(1). Two conditions must, however, first be satisfied. First,
the order must be a valid order of protection authorized by the Illinois Domestic Violence
Act of 1986, Section 214, subsection (b), paragraphs (1) and (2). Second, the offender
must either have been served with the order or must have actual knowledge of the con-
tents of the order. Id. at para. 12-30(a)(l)-(2). The order may have been issued either in
a civil or criminal proceeding by any circuit or associate judge in the State of Illinois. Id.
at para. 12-30(b). The inherent power of the court to enforce orders through civil or
criminal contempt proceedings remains unaffected. Id. at para. 12-30(c).
415. Id. at para. 12-30(d)(1). The court may increase the defendant's penalty over
any penalty previously imposed by any court for his prior violation of an order of protec-
tion. Id.
416. Id. at para. 12-30(d)(2). The court is limited in ordering imprisonment only by a
showing of manifest injustice to the defendant. Id. Section 5-9-1 of the Unified Code of
Corrections authorizes such a fine and section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections
authorizes restitution. Id.
417. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 129, para. 220.94a (Supp. 1987).
418. Id. at para. 220.94a (b)(1).
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for the purpose of civil disorder.41 9 Violations of the statute are
punishable as Class 4 felonies. 20
IV. CONCLUSION
Both the Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois State General
Assembly contributed significantly to the body of Illinois criminal
law during the Survey period. The court continued to defer greatly
to the decisions of trial courts in felony cases, generally upholding
findings of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt even when such find-
ings were based upon circumstantial evidence or accomplice wit-
ness testimony. The court, however, ruled steadfastly against
convictions based upon improper factors and reversed multiple
convictions arising from a single act. The court ruled also upon
the trial courts' interpretation of lesser included offense instruc-
tions to juries and effectively abolished the "reasonable theory of
innocence" instruction.
The court directed significant attention to interpreting and rul-
ing upon the constitutionality of several statutes. The court
strictly construed the statutes regarding deadly use of force in de-
fense of dwellings, unlawful use of weapons, eavesdropping, and
chemical blood analysis for DUI charges. The court specifically
held the highway solicitation and seat belt statutes constitutional,
but declared a portion of the aggravated arson statute unconstitu-
tional. The court upheld also the penalty provisions for look-alike
controlled substances. In addition, the court effected the future
course of disciplinary proceedings against attorneys by strictly in-
terpreting the elements of forgery in one case and demanding strict
compliance with the requirements of due process for criminal con-
tempt proceedings in another.
Perhaps the most significant development in the body of Illinois
criminal law was the court's expressed desire to have both direct
and circumstantial evidence treated alike, at both the trial and ap-
pellate court levels. Apart from this major development, the indi-
vidual decisions, though important to the issues decided, do not
have a common theme. In truth, the closest they come to a com-
mon theme is that many who "won the battle lost the war."
419. Id. at para. 220.94a(b)(2).
420. Id. at para. 220.94a(c). The General Assembly provided for specific exemptions
for law enforcement officials, federal officials performing official duties, members of the
Armed Forces and National Guard and a variety of sporting commissions and clubs
whose primary purpose is the safe handling of weapons employed in connection with
sporting or other lawful activity. Id. at para. 220.94a(d)(l)-(4).
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Consider Lego, who won on the merits of his legal argument,
but is still facing execution; Sawyer, who was selected as the suitor
of preference, but convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of the
losing suitor; Upton, who though she did not deal in narcotics but
merely a "look-alike substance," subjected herself to more severe
penalties; and finally, Emrich, who persuaded the court to affirm
the suppression of his blood sample on his DUI charge, only to
have the court reverse the suppression order as to the more serious
reckless homicide charge.
The Illinois State General Assembly enacted or amended a sig-
nificant body of law during the Survey period. In an effort to pro-
tect the safety of its citizenry, the Assembly expanded the crimes of
disorderly conduct, amended the residential burglary statute, and
enacted major revisions in the homicide statute. The legislature
also revised the feticide law and created new offenses relating to
civil disorder and domestic violence.
To protect the health of its people, the legislature created the
offense of tampering with food, drugs, or cosmetics, amended the
Cannabis Control Act, the Controlled Substances Act, the Narcot-
ics and Profit Forfeiture Act, and the Liquor Control Act. In addi-
tion, the Assembly continued its battle for highway safety,
upholding certain provisions of the DUI statute effecting certain
procedural changes in them.
Finally, in order to protect the welfare of its constituents, the
Assembly created new offenses relating to fraud and sexual crimes
against children. The Assembly expanded the rights of victims of
crime, granted the state the right to jury trials, created the Privacy
of Child Victims of Criminal Sexual Offenses Act, and legalized
charitable games for non-profit organizations.
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